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Abstract 
This paper contains an investigation of the modern literature on economic growth and 
endogenous fertility. The review of the most influential economic models is aimed at 
explaining the main forces that have been proposed as triggers for the so called 
demographic transition (that is the passage from a state of high fertility and economic 
growth to another one characterized by low fertility); children quality in the form of 
human capital, infant mortality and the introduction of social security systems will be 
fully analysed in this work. Moreover, a special attention is devoted one of the most 
famous model that is able to incorporate fertility choices into agents’ behaviour, the 
Barro-Becker (1989) model. Finally, a data analysis will investigate the income-
population relation, both on a Global and Regional perspective, in order to understand 
the inner causes of the demographic transition. 
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Altruism and Endogenous Fertility 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Some authors claim that the literature on population and economic growth is about as 
old as economic science itself (Ehrlich and Lui, 1997); fact the idea of measuring 
income in per capita terms and the analysis of economic consequences of population 
dynamics can be dated before the classics. However a group of studies concerning the 
relation between fertility and growth can be recognized after the seminal work by 
Malthus (1798), in which it is argued that the fertility rate is exogenously determined at 
the maximum natural rate and that population increases is detrimental for income per 
capita. 
Nevertheless, this pessimistic conclusion is based to a number of crucial 
hypotheses (among all the exogeneity of crude birth and death rates) that denote what in 
literature is called the “Malthusian World”. The change of these assumptions has been 
the starting point for modern research on economic and demographic studies. 
The availability of more reliable data on population and economic growth made 
scholars unveil the non univocal correlation between these two variables, and drove the 
literature to develop models in which fertility and economic quantities (e.g. income) are 
both endogenous. 
Obviously, new theories had to get rid of some of the fundamental “classical” 
assumptions; the most relevant is the abandonment of land as a critical factor 
determining production constraints, and that is the reason why they are recognized as 
“neoclassical” growth theories. 
The first attempts to reconcile growth with individual choices is due to the 
seminal works by Solow and Swan (1956), Koopmans (1965) and Cass (1965), 
according to whom the main driver is to be recognized in factors accumulation; 
however, most of these models keep on treating population growth and fertility choices 
as given and exogenous phenomena. These models predicts that population growth will 
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not bring the economy to a subsistence level of income (like in Malthus). Instead agents' 
interest will ensure a rate of savings high enough to match (and overtake) the population 
effect, and lead the economy to an accumulation path (at least) sufficient to ensure per 
capita income growth (although this is not in line with what empirically observed by 
Coale and Hoover (1958) and Enke, 1960, 1976). Not surprisingly, the results of those 
theories is that the output level will be influenced by the exogenous socio-economic 
parameters, like the saving and the fertility rate (Solow and Swan, 1956), while its 
growth is entirely determinate by the technological progress. Consequently, it becomes 
self-evident that the so called “exogenous growth theories” cannot be effectively 
adopted for policy making. 
Moreover, an interesting improvement of former theories of economic growth has 
been triggered by the OLG literature (see Allais, 1947 and Samuelson, 1958, further 
extended by Diamond, 1965). The basics of these theories lay in the analysis of an 
economy made by agents who live for a certain amount of periods and want to 
maximize a lifetime value function (in general an utility one), subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint. The interesting point of these models is to be 
recognized in the heterogeneity of household characteristics over the lifecycle, generally 
expressed in the possibility of accumulating human capital and raising income in 
different periods of life. This premise is necessary to fully understand why this 
framework is particularly suitable for the developing of a theory of fertility choices. 
In fact, the main scope of the introduction of fertility choices in growth models is 
to explain a widely accepted empirical regularity in many countries' fertility trends, the 
so called demographic transition. Its inner nature can be partially explained by the 
following sentence: 
 
In traditional societies, fertility and mortality are high. In modern societies, 
fertility and mortality are low. In between, there is demographic transition. 
(Demeny, 1968, p. 520)  
 
According to this phenomenon, a certain force or group of forces triggered an incentive 
in the industrialized World to have less children in exchange for lower mortality levels 
(but the relation can be easily extended to many other socio-economic benefits, like 
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higher income and human capital per capita or better welfare systems). 
The first model to tackle the topic has been presented by Becker (1960).1 In his 
work, the author endogenizes the choice on the number and the quality of children 
introducing this variable in the parents' utility function, together with income and 
parental knowledge on contraception; in this way, offspring is treated as a durable good. 
However, this framework presents some strengths and weaknesses; the main advantage 
is in it microfundation, but lots of inconveniences emerge because of the static structure 
of the model, according to which all decisions are taken in a single period of time. 
Many other subsequent works, although inspired to the Becker (1960) 
assumptions, tried to overcome the shortcomings of the model. One of the most 
important is the Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989), which will be 
presented in this thesis. More precisely, the work proceeds as follows. 
In Chapter 1 we will analyse the different stream of thoughts upon the fertility 
choice theory with an altruistic parents set up; a special attention will be devoted to 
Becker-Barro reviews. In Chapter 2 we will present the Becker-Barro (1988) with its 
analytical setting and equilibrium properties; we will also focus on some comparative 
statics exercises of the model in relation to fundamental literature’s results on altruistic 
parents and endogenous fertility. In Chapter 3 we will propose an empirical data 
analysis devoted to understanding the relationship between economic and demographic 
fundamentals, with a particular attention to the demographic transition process within 
several countries; different hypothesis on historical and contemporary data will be 
explained and tested on a qualitative and quantitative basis. Chapter 4 summarizes the 
results. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Actually, others dealt with parental fertility choices before Becker; among all Banks (1954) and 
Liebesntein (1957). However, their works consider children as common consumer goods, instead of 
durables. 
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Chapter 1: Review of Altruistic Literature 
 
 
In this Chapter we will deal with three different theories that try to explain the 
demographic transition phenomenon in frameworks with endogenous fertility and 
altruistic parents. First, we will be consider the effect of children quality and human 
capital on fertility; this approach leads to the well-known tradeoff between quantity and 
quality which will be developed in the first part of the Chapter. Second we will analyse 
the impact of infant and child mortality decline on the demand for children; this issue is 
particularly relevant when it comes to studying developing countries’ economies 
characterized by high levels of infant mortality and fertility. Finally, the last part will 
analyse the effect of the introduction of social security systems on the demand for 
children. Although this aspect has received much attention in the case of selfish parents, 
it has some interesting implications in an altruistic setting, both on the side of 
responsiveness of fertility to changes in the economic context and sustainability of 
social security systems themselves. 
 
 
1.1 Quality-Quantity tradeoff 
 
One of the most common and surely most known relations that emerge from the 
demographic transition is the inverse relation between the number of children and 
various measures of their quality; in this sense, authors have used, both theoretically and 
empirically, different concepts to account for child quality, but mainly they can be 
grouped in two categories. The first one is the idea offered by Becker (1960), by which 
children quality has to be considered as the amount of resources spent in each child that 
contributes to parents utility; this literature will be briefly presented in the first part of 
this Chapter. The second and most important model is the one provided by Lucas (1988) 
and further developed by Tamura (1988) in an endogenous fertility setting, in presence 
of human capital; this concept is particularly useful for two reasons. First, it is more 
realistic and concrete, as it can be modelled to account for accumulation processes and 
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externalities affecting it. The role of human capital in explaining the different 
development patterns of countries through time (between the Malthusian and the 
Modern Era) and space (between developing and developed countries) will be treated in 
the second part of this Chapter. Second it permits the introduction of some fundamental 
modern forms of education systems; a comparison between public and private provided 
schooling systems will be developed in the last part of this Chapter. 
 
 
1.1.1 Children's quality 
 
The seminal work on this field has to be attributed to Becker (1960). The concept of 
“quality” of children will play an important role for future developments, so that a 
clarification is required. Quoting Becker, “I will call more expensive children "higher 
quality" children...To avoid any misunderstanding, let me hasten to add that "higher 
quality" does not mean morally better. If more is voluntarily spent on one child than on 
another, it is because the parents obtain additional utility from the additional 
expenditure and it is this additional utility which we call higher "quality."” 
Given this necessary premise, the result the author finds is that in modern 
societies the elasticity of quantity of children to income can be positive, but certainly 
lower than the value of the quality elasticity to income. This result has a huge impact on 
the responsiveness of fertility to economic growth, in such a way that the Malthusian 
monotone positive relation between income per capita and offspring quantity will be 
nullified. However, owing to its static characteristics, this model is capable of 
generating equilibria that reflect the emergence of the demographic transition, but 
certainly not its inner causes. Such a result can be explained in light of two main 
factors. 
First, child mortality has fallen so low that, as parents are interested in the quality 
and quantity of surviving children, an increase in income will have little or no effect on 
cohort size. Second, improvements of economic condition experienced in last decades 
have been accompanied by an increasing awareness of contraception, leading to a 
reduction in unwanted procreations. Finally, as children characteristics are only those 
two previously recalled (quality and quantity), the effect of income that does not impact 
9 
 
on quantity will surely influence positively quality. 
The key features of this framework are also contained in Becker and Lewis 
(1973). In their model, parents are willing to maximize a generic utility function: 
 
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑞, 𝑛)                (I.1) 
 
Where 𝑐 is the consumption of other commodities than children, 𝑞 is the quality of each 
child and 𝑛 is their number. The budget constraint is thus given by: 
 
𝑦 = 𝑝𝑞𝑛𝑞 + 𝑐𝑝𝑐              (I.2) 
 
Where 𝑦 is the level of income, 𝑝𝑞 is the unitary price of 𝑛 children of quality 𝑞 and 𝑝𝑐 
is the unitary price of consumption 𝑐. Results of this (Becker and Lewis, 1973) model 
are in line with Becker (1960). Moreover, this framework gives an explanation to the 
income elasticities described in Becker (1960); in fact, the shadow price of the quantity 
of children turns out to be increasing in their level of quality, and viceversa. 
Consequently, there is a quality-quantity tradeoff. 
An interesting development of this theory is the work by Razin and Ben Zion 
(1975). In their work they investigate the effects of a public subsidy for child quality 
investments, finding similar results to those predicted by Becker and Lewis (1973); in 
fact, this increase in parental income will shift mostly to child endowment either than on 
their number. However, they also find that an increase in capital productivity will boost 
its accumulation and lower population growth rate. As a consequence, wages will rise 
and this has an uncertain effect on fertility. However, in order to achieve a proper 
microfunded intergenerational structure it is necessary to analyse the formulations by 
Abel (1985) and Becker-Barro (1986), which will be studied in Chapter 2.  
 
 
1.1.2 Human Capital 
 
The development of this literature takes place in models à la Becker-Barro with of pure 
parental altruism on one side, and the concept of human capital accumulation as an 
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endogenous engine to growth (see Lucas, 1988). The seminal work to tackle this issue is 
the one by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) (1994) and Tamura (1994), which 
reformulate what contained in Tamura (1988). The first two models (Becker, Murphy 
and Tamura, 1990; 1994) are based on the idea that parental resources (for instance, 
working time) are devoted to children human capital accumulation (what was first 
consider to be the quality), whose investments exhibit non-monotonically decreasing 
rate of return. As both child endowment and number are included as dynastic arguments 
of choice, the finding of the paper is in some sense in line with what found in previous 
seminal works; in fact it turns out that the basic relation between quality and quantity 
will continue to be negative due to the increasing returns hypothesis. However, the 
parental investment will affect also income per capita (as in Lucas, 1988), and this lead 
to the existence of three steady state equilibria. The first will be characterized by a 
stable Malthusian trap, in which households chose high fertility and low investments in 
children human capital; the necessary condition in order to make this equilibrium 
emerge is: 
 
[𝑎(𝑛𝑢)]
−1 > 𝑅ℎ   𝑖𝑓  𝐻 = 0               (I.3) 
 
Where H represents human capital per worker. In this case, the discount rate of future 
utilities [𝑎(𝑛𝑢)]
−1 is higher than the rate of return on human capital 𝑅ℎ. The second 
stable steady state is characterized by low fertility and abundant physical and human 
capita accumulation, and it is found when the following equation is satisfied: 
 
[𝑎(𝑛∗)]−1 = 𝑅(𝐻∗)              (I.4) 
 
Which corresponds to the situation in which the discount rate of future utility 
[𝑎(𝑛𝑢)]
−1 is equal to the rate of return on human capital 𝑅ℎ. An unstable intermediate 
situation lays in between.  
The second model (Tamura, 1994) proves the existence of an optimal value 
function when an endogenous discount rate of future utilities is taken into consideration. 
The results the author finds are consistent with what discovered by Becker, Murphy and 
Tamura (1990), but some additional features are strongly highlighted. First of all, the 
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optimal value of consumption is positively related to the human capital investment, so 
that the stable equilibria exhibit an inverse relation between fertility and income growth 
rate; second, the parental level of human capital has a strong impact on their 
investments in children endowment (see also Becker and Tomes, 1986). This second 
result turns out to be in accordance with the empirical findings of many authors, among 
all Fernández and Rogerson (1996).  
Tamura (1996) implemented the same model structure accounting for a non 
concave (as the  works quoted before) and discontinuous value function, according to 
which the presence of a threshold ℎ′ in the level of human capital determines the 
shifting from a low accumulation pattern to another characterized by a higher level 
accumulation: 
 
𝐻𝑡+1 = 𝐴(ℎ𝑡 + 𝛾ℎ
∗)𝜏𝑡                   𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑡 < ℎ
′          (I.5) 
𝐻𝑡+1 = 𝐴ℎ𝑡
𝛿
[(ℎ𝑡 + 𝛾𝐻
∗)𝑧𝑡]
1−𝛿     𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑡 ≥ ℎ
′          (I.6) 
 
Where ℎ𝑡 is the social human capital, 𝛿 ∈ (0,1) is the degree of its externality on 
the accumulation process ℎ∗ is the unskilled level of human capital and 𝑧𝑡 is the amount 
of time invested in child. The dynastic parent at time t maximizes its utility function 
under the following constraint: 
 
𝑈(𝑐𝑡, 𝑛𝑡 , ℎ𝑡+1) = ∑ 𝛼
𝑠−𝑡{𝛼 ln(𝑐𝑠) + (1 − 𝛼)ln (𝑛𝑠)}
∞
𝑠=𝑡         (I.7) 
 
Where α is the parental degree of altruism. Moreover, the budget constraint can be 
expressed by: 
 
𝑐𝑡 = [ℎ𝑡 + ℎ
∗][1 − 𝑛𝑡(𝜑 + 𝜏𝑡)]           (I.8) 
 
Where 𝜑 is the fixed time cost of raising children. The results of this paper are quite 
articulated and depict a quite reliable picture; the Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) 
(1994) equilibrium structure emerges, but some more implications are drawn on the side 
of income convergence and higher growth of less developed countries with respect to 
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modern ones. Moreover, the empirical implications offered in the paper are very 
powerful mean in explaining the demographic transition phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, those previous models rely strongly on the assumptions of imperfect 
capital markets; in such a situation the only way parents can invest in children human 
capital is via reductions of current consumption or fertility, because of the resources’ 
constraint. Regarding this limitation, the same Becker and Tomes (1994) studied the 
implications of the introduction of an efficient capital system, so that even poor parents 
could borrow to invest in offspring quality and leave that debt as a negative inheritance 
(see also Barro, 1974). The model relies on the distinction between earnings deriving 
from human capital investments and from other sources of wealth (productive assets) 
left as a bequest, and on the assumption that the returns of the first are strictly higher 
than the second. In particular, earnings 𝑦𝑡 deriving from human capital take the 
following form: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑇𝑡𝑓𝑡)ℎ𝑡𝛼 + 𝜈𝑡              (I.9) 
 
Where 𝜃 is the return on human capital, 𝑇𝑡 is the level of technological knowledge, 𝑓𝑡 is 
the amount of human to non-human capital (
ℎ𝑡
𝑘𝑡
), ℎ𝑡 is the level of human capital, αis the 
level of endowment common to all members of a given cohort and 𝜈𝑡 is the shock 
affecting earnings (luck in transmission of family endowments from a generation to the 
subsequent); it is assumed that 𝑦𝑡 responds positively to 𝑇𝑡, but the contrary holds for 
𝑓𝑡. 
2 The second type of earnings is indirectly detected by its impact on the 
accumulation of human capital, so that a general form is attached to it: 
 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝜓(𝑘𝑡, 𝑒𝑡−1, 𝑠𝑡−1)            (I.10) 
 
Where 𝑘𝑡 is the total level of material inheritance, 𝑒𝑡−1 and 𝑠𝑡−1 are the parental and 
public expenditures in human capital respectively. As in previous works, the form of the 
inheritance transfer function shows how high endowed parents will have high endowed, 
                                                 
2 Note that this assumption on 𝑓𝑡 is exactly the contrary of what imposed by Becker, Murphy and Tamura 
(1990) to achieve their results. 
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so that in principle the model would reproduce the same results of previous works. 
Hence, if the possibility for poor parents to borrow money from an efficient capital 
market is introduced, they find that the degree of intergenerational mobility in earnings 
would equal the degree of inheritability of endowments. However there are some 
problems related to this approach. First of all, poor families have generally little 
possibility to access credit for investing in offspring; moreover, the degree of  
intergenerational mobility in earnings depends on the number of children to divide the 
resources among, and this is particularly relevant when the first limitation holds. 
A very long time prospective is taken into consideration by the unified framework 
by Galor and Moav (2002), who studied the evolutionary dynamics of a population with 
heterogeneous (determined by cultural lineage, for instance) preferences over the 
quality and quantity of children. The two main peculiarities of their model are the 
production function and preferences. On the technological side, Malthusian hypothesis 
are reproduced thanks to the introduction of a fixed factor 𝑋 in production, which might 
be interpreted as land: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡
1−𝛼(𝐴𝑡𝑋)
𝛼            (I.11) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑡 is the total output, 𝐻𝑡 is the level of efficiency units of labour and 𝐴𝑡 is the 
level of technology. 
The peculiarity of tastes relates to the possibility of having two different groups of 
individuals, a quality preferring and a quantity-preferring, distinguished by the weight 
𝛽𝑖 attached to child quality: 
 
𝑈(𝑐𝑡, 𝑛𝑡 , ℎ𝑡+1) = (1 − 𝛾) ln(𝑐𝑡
𝑖) + 𝛾[ln(𝑛𝑡
𝑖) + 𝛽𝑖 ln(ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 )]     (I.12) 
0 < 𝛾 < 1  
 
Where 𝑐𝑡
𝑖 is the household consumption of an individual of type i and generation t, 𝑛𝑡
𝑖  is 
the number of children of an individual in generation i and ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖  is the level of human 
capital of each child. 
Given this formulation, in the initial stage the quality-preferring group exhibits a 
14 
 
higher fertility, rising the average human capital, because the resources constraint is 
burdening; this result is attained as the basic assumption is, as often happened in 
previous models, that children are time costly to be grown and educated. In the latter 
regime, the higher level of income per person will bring the quantity-preferring group to 
achieve a higher fertility at the expense of average quality, with a consequent reduction 
of human capital per offspring. This is a possible explanation to the different patterns of 
income-fertility characterizing the “Malthusian World” and the Modern Era. 
On the side of the income-fertility relation, a very interesting work has been 
proposed by Moav (2005). This model considers a generalized Becker-Lewis 
framework, in which dynastic utility does not have a particular form and production 
functions of final output and human capital are not necessarily non-convex. In fact, the 
assumption of an increasing child rearing cost in their quality and of quality costs in the 
children number is maintained,3 while it is assumed that the parents' productivity in 
educating offspring is increasing in their human capital stock. The economy is 
characterized by two-periods living individuals maximizing a utility function similar to 
that proposed by Galor and Moav (2002):4 
 
𝑢𝑡
𝑖 = (1 − 𝛾) ln(𝑐𝑡
𝑖) + 𝛾[ln ( 𝑛𝑡
𝑖) + 𝜃ln (𝑤ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 )]        (I.13) 
0 < 𝛽 < 1  
 
The accumulation function of human capital ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖  is assumed to be an increasing and 
concave function of investments in children education in period 𝑡, 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑖 : 
 
ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 = ℎ(𝑒𝑡+1
𝑖 )             (I.14) 
 
According to all assumptions made so far, the result is that the relative price of quantity 
in terms of quality is an increasing function of parents' wage, which generates a 
comparative advantage for poor households to choose a large fertility, while driving 
                                                 
3 This is what generates the non-convex budget set in the Becker-Lewis (1974) model. 
4 Note that the parameter 𝛽 weights both the quality and quantity of children, but in particular it 
represents a relative weight in terms of consumption. 
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wealthy parents to invest in human capital. Finally, the non-convexity of the budget set 
works as an amplifying effect for advantages. Hence, results of the model are quite 
intuitive; the Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) prediction of the two stable equilibria 
framework still hold, though there are some inequality issues to be taken into account. 
While in the Becker et al. (1990) framework there is convergence among households in 
the same country, this model does not ensure this convergence. It might be the case that 
poverty is persistent also in a rich economy if income is unequally distributed. These 
results are in line with what empirically found by Perotti (1996), Barro (1999) and de la 
Croix-Doepke (2003). 
Besides a number of empirical investigations on the quality-quantity tradeoff, 
some authors have discovered new peculiar features, emerging in some specific 
circumstances, according to which there might be a positive relation between quantity 
and quality of children. Yasuoka and Nakamura (2006) recognized such a situation from 
Japan experience as a consequence of some child care public supports. The basic 
framework is characterized by an economy populated by individuals maximizing the 
following utility function:5 
 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝛼 ln(𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+1) + (1 − 𝛼) ln(𝑐𝑡+1)           (I.15) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Parents need a certain amount of time 𝜑 to rise their children, they spend 𝑥 for any unit 
of education 𝑒𝑡 and 𝑧 for child-caring, hence the budget constraint will be given by: 
 
𝑥𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑧𝑛𝑡 +
𝑐𝑡+1
1+𝑟𝑡+1
= (1 − 𝜑𝑛𝑡)𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡         (I.16) 
 
The human capital accumulation process ℎ𝑡+1 is assumed to lay both on the investment 
for education 𝑒𝑡 and in the level of parental human capital ℎ𝑡: 
 
ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑒𝑡
𝜀ℎ𝑡
1−𝜀             (I.17) 
                                                 
5 It is self-evident that the altruism of parents is so pervasive that only the level of consumption of their 
children enter the utility function. 
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Then, the introduction of a child-care support policy is considered. This 
government measure will lower the child rearing cost, z, which will  determine a 
fertility increase in the short run. However, the model shows how this policy is 
ineffective in the long run. Authors argue that the negative effect determined by the 
reduction in the relative cost of rearing children will increase fertility at the expense of 
its quality; as already explained by previous literature, this will tend to lower human 
capital accumulation in the long run, so that income per capita in equilibrium. As a 
result, the income effect will negatively impact on fertility, bringing it to the same level 
as if the child policy were not applied. On the other side, the effect of an educational 
subsidy will be in line with what foreseen by de la Croix and Doepke (2003) (2004). 
Finally, a rather complete analysis of the problem is offered in the paper by Vogl 
(2013). Building the framework on Galor and Moav (2002), the model assumes a utility 
function in the following form: 
 
𝑈(𝑐𝑡, 𝑛𝑡,ℎ𝑡+1) = 𝛽 ln(𝑐𝑡) + (1 − 𝛽)[ln(𝑛𝑡) + 𝛼 ln(ℎ𝑡+1)]     (I.18) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1 , 0 < 𝛽 < 1  
 
The human capital accumulation is a linear version of that proposes by de la Croix and 
Doepke (2003): 
 
ℎ𝑡+1(𝑒𝑡) = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑒𝑡            (I.19) 
 
so that the level of human capital is linear in the educational investment 𝑒𝑡 during 
childhood. Finally, irrespective of human capital, each child costs 𝜏 units of parents time 
and 𝑘 units of goods, so that the budget constraint is represented as follows: 
 
𝑐𝑡 + 𝑘𝑛𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝑤ℎ𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝑛𝑡)          (I.20) 
 
Where w is the wage in real terms and ℎ𝑡 is the parental human capital in efficiency 
unit. The model shows that the relation between skills and fertility is hump-shaped; as a 
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consequence, given that earnings rise in the level of human capital, the positive impact 
of income on fertility is to be attributed to the fact that the largest share of the 
population laid in the segment where that function is actually increasing. Hence higher 
skills implied higher fertility. This would lead in the long run to an increase in the 
average level of human capital, to an increase in income and to a system in which 
parents have enough resources to invest in children education. This virtuous cycle 
brings the population to the part of the graph in which the relation between skills and 
fertility is actually negative, and this explains the common pattern experienced in the 
Modern Era. An empirical validation of the model is provided; the results are basically 
that the only significant component is just the level of skills, while other issues like 
social security systems and child mortality do not apparently play any role. 
 
 
1.1.3 The effect of different schooling systems on human capital 
accumulation 
 
The link between education and economic growth explained in previous models has 
been tested in a number of authors, among all Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and O' Neill (1995); all of them find 
conditional convergence among a set of rich and fast developing countries in which 
education is a conditioning variable. 
Thanks to these studies, the research interest focused on the main determinants for 
the accumulation of human capital and its policy implications, in particular on the side 
of the choice between a public or a private schooling system. Some earliest most 
remarkable contributions on this aspect are Glomm and Ravikumar (1992),6 Eckstein 
and Zilcha (1994) and Zhang (1997); they analyse the effect induced by the introduction 
of some forms of public educational subsidies on human capital investments and 
fertility. Besides some differences in their framework, all of them find that the lower 
cost of education relative to consumption drives higher investments in human capital 
                                                 
6 Although it considers fertility as an exogenous fixed parameter, it is worth quoting this work for the 
interesting idea of considering the impact of public and private schooling according to different 
distribution of income and human capital. 
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and higher growth, causing a negative impact on fertility rates. This seems to be in line 
with what predicted by previous models. However, if this policy is financed by the 
introduction of lamp-sum taxes on consumption or income, fertility will be increased as 
well; it is proven that its responsiveness to tax distortions is positive (Zhang, 1997). 
Moreover, a similar effect will apply in retarding human capital accumulation, as 
a consequence of a reduction in its future rates of return (Eckstein and Zilcha, 1994). 
Eventually none of the effects is certain. With the purpose of investigating the net effect 
on both previous choices, Zhang and Casagrande (1998) develop an altruistic model that 
assesses both theoretically and empirically the results. Assuming a logarithmic utility of 
the following form: 
 
𝑉𝑡 = ln(𝑐𝑡) + 𝜌 ln(𝑛𝑡) + 𝛼𝑉𝑡+1          (I.21) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Where 𝑉𝑡+1 is the children welfare. The human capital accumulation process is assumed 
to be influenced both by parental human capital 𝐻𝑡 and their private expenditure in 
children education 𝑒𝑡: 
 
𝐻𝑡+1 = 𝐴𝑒𝑡
𝛿𝐻𝑡
1−𝛿            (I.22) 
 
Each individual produces according to a linear production function (1 − 𝜈𝑛𝑡)𝐻𝑡 and 
allocates the output between consumption and investment in child education. The 
government imposes a flat consumption tax 𝜏𝐶 or an income tax 𝜏𝐼 in order to subsidize 
education at a flat rate 𝑠 and finance its own not productive consumption; the authors 
assume that this consumption is fixed at 𝛾𝐺 in per old income terms. Hence the two 
budget constraints faced by agents and government are: 
 
(1 − 𝜏𝐶)𝑐𝑡 = (1 − 𝜈𝑛𝑡)𝐻𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝐼) − (1 − 𝑠)𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑡       (I.23) 
𝜏𝑐𝑐𝑡 + (1 − 𝜈𝑛𝑡)ℎ𝑡𝜏𝐼 = 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾𝐺(1 − 𝜈𝑛𝑡)ℎ𝑡       (I.24) 
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Where 𝑛𝑡, ℎ𝑡, 𝑐𝑡 and 𝑒𝑡 denote the average values of associated variables. The authors 
prove that the net impact on children education investments is positive, while the one on 
fertility is nil; the empirical testing validates these results. 
An interesting departure from this framework is the model by de la Croix and 
Doepke (2004). Founded on the results contained in Mare (1997) and Fernández and 
Rogerson (2001), 7 and the framework by de la Croix and Doepke (2003), it considers 
the different impact on inequality and income growth due to different schooling 
systems, in the case in which parents choose fertility and human capital investments in 
their offspring, while fertility differentials are relevant. In their model they consider 
two-lived agents who care about their consumption 𝑐𝑡, the number of children 𝑛𝑡 and 
their human capital ℎ𝑡+1: 
 
𝑈(𝑐𝑡, 𝑛𝑡 , ℎ𝑡+1) = ln(𝑐𝑡
𝑖) + 𝛼 ln(𝑛𝑡
𝑖ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 )        (I.25) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Where 𝛼 is the degree of parental altruism. Assume that child rearing absorbs a fixed 
quantity 𝜈 of parental working time and education is provided by teachers endowed 
with the same average human capital of the population ℎ?̅? and financed by private 
parental investments 𝑒𝑡, so that the budget constraint is represented by: 
 
𝑐𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑒𝑡
𝑖ℎ̅𝑡
𝑖 = ℎ𝑡
𝑖(1 − 𝜈𝑛𝑡
𝑖)           (I.26) 
 
The human capital accumulation process is the result of the effects implied by 
educational investments and parental human capital: 
 
ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝜇(𝜃 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑖)
𝜂
(ℎ𝑡
𝑖)
𝜈
(ℎ𝑡
𝑖
)
1−𝜂
          (I.27) 
 
                                                 
7 The first one basically finds that fertility differentials per se are too small in the U.S. to have large 
effects on average education, while the second proves that the association of fertility differentials with 
the degree of marital sorting can lead to sizable long-run effects. 
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When a public education system is introduced, parents do not have to decide about 
private schooling investments 𝑒𝑡, but the government provides a common education 
service 𝑒𝑡
𝑖
 for all the children by levying a proportional income tax 𝜏𝐼. In the end, the 
new budget constraint results in the following: 
 
𝑐𝑡
𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏𝐼)ℎ𝑡
𝑖(1 − 𝜈𝑛𝑡
𝑖)           (I.28) 
 
and the human capital accumulation is: 
 
ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝜇 (𝜃 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑖
)
𝜂
(ℎ𝑡
𝑖)
𝜈
(ℎ𝑡
𝑖
)
1−𝜂
         (I.29) 
 
These model’s results are that public school tends to distort fertility to higher values 
keeping lower levels of education; this finding emerges as in this situation parents are 
not internalizing the cost for a higher number of children, and, in fact, income growth 
rate tends to be lower than in the case of private schooling. 8 Finally, another 
fundamental result is that, in case of household income heterogeneity, public school 
might be a preferable system to avoid high and low skilled fertility rate deriving from 
poor parents (this is the fertility differential), as this will negatively affect both income 
per capita and its distribution as well. For an important generalization of this model, see 
also Fan and Zhang (2013). 
An interesting improvement of the stream of literature related with the model by 
de la Croix and Doepke (2004) has been proposed by Azarnet (2008). In particular, 
Azarnet criticizes the strong limitation of de la Croix and Doepke framework to the 
polar situations in which education is entirely provided either by a private sector or by 
the government. Instead, the author analyses the case in which parents can choose the 
optimal level of children's human capital ℎ𝑡+1, the number of children 𝑛𝑡 and 
                                                 
8 The same result is attained by Palivos and Scotese (1996). They consider the implications of the 
financing of governmental services to children, such as education, when fertility decisions are 
endogenously determined. They show that, when the services to children are financed by taxation, the 
equilibrium outcome is upward biased from the socially preferred result toward higher fertility rates 
and lower economic growth, because each household internalizes the benefits, but not the costs of the 
tax-financed services. 
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consumption 𝑐, and than observe the impact on those choices of the introduction of a 
free educational system in various stage of development (hence now human capital 
accumulation is a general function of privately and publicly provided education). In 
particular, agents maximize a utility function of the form: 
 
𝑈(𝑐𝑡, 𝑛𝑡 , ℎ𝑡+1) = (1 − 𝛼) ln(𝑐𝑡) + 𝛼𝑙𝑛(𝑤𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+1)       (I.30) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Assume that parents incur a cost 𝛽 in order to raise children and invest 𝑒𝑡 in their 
private education, so that the budget constraint results in the following form: 
 
𝑐𝑡 +𝑤(𝛽ℎ𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡)𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝑤ℎ𝑡           (I.31) 
 
As already said, the level of human capital owned by parents is crucial in many of the 
framework examined so far, and this leads basically to the two equilibria setting already 
discovered by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990). However, the introduction of a free 
schooling service may represent the only possibility for poor household offspring to 
accumulate enough human capital to escape poverty: in this sense the impact of such a 
system is proven to have positive effects on quality of children, as parents will not 
invest privately on their education because of lack of resources. On the other side, 
fertility choices will not be affected at all. If instead the household is enough well off to 
invest on children education privately, the effect of such a policy will be to displace 
investments from parents in favour of children quantity, but this effect has a negative 
impact on the aggregate level of human capital. A fundamental result of this model is 
that the quantity of human capital that each child gains from the public schooling 
system affects negatively that threshold under which parents do not add private 
educational investments to the public ones; this means that the efficiency of those public 
subsidies play a key role for the take-off from the Malthusian stagnant steady state. 
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2.2 Infant and Child Mortality 
 
The importance of infant and child mortality has been recognized since the Malthusian 
model. In particular, the basic intuition behind this relation is to be searched in the 
desire of parents for surviving children, and not children in general. This idea, together 
with the consideration of the low mortality rates attained in recent times, have been 
developed qualitatively by Becker (1960) in order to prove that child mortality decline 
will have a sensitive effect in reducing the family size. However, its contribution is 
recognized through an indirect channel, according to which the reduction in mortality 
would reduce the cost of high quality offspring, lowering its number. 
 Given this premise, it is not surprising that for deeply understanding the main 
causes of demographic transition, a complete analytical study on the relation between 
child and infant mortality and fertility is required. In simple terms, two strategies to 
tackle this issue have been proposed. The first one is characterized by an exogenous 
treatment of mortality; agents face infant mortality as a parameter according to which 
they maximize their intertemporal choices. This situation is likely to happen in case 
parents believe that any measure undertaken on the side of children health care (either 
private or public) will be ineffective in increasing offspring survival probability. This 
setting will be developed in the first part of this Chapter. The second one assumes that 
parents perceive a possibility (strong or weak) for them to influence positively the 
survival probability of their children through investments in health care and sanitation 
(accompanied by other factors according to the framework, e.g. parental human capital). 
Besides being more realistic, this framework helps in explaining the emergence, even in 
developing countries, of various forms of publicly provided health systems and 
assistance programs for parents and children during the birth time. In this sense, as 
parents are concerned with the number (or the welfare) of surviving children, we can 
state that child and infant mortality is endogeneized in agents’ choices. 
 
 
1.2.1 Exogenous mortality 
 
The first group of models dealing structurally with the mortality issue has been Ben-
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Porath and Welch (1972), O'Hara (1975) and Ben-Porath (1976); while the first (Ben-
Porath and Welch, 1972) considers differences between parental fertility choices under a 
certain and risky framework,9 the others deal with changes in child and infant mortality 
and fertility responses in case of some expectations structures.  
The model proposed by Ben-Porath and Welch (1972) is built on the assumption 
that lifetime is divided in 3 different periods and children have a probability 𝑝1 of not 
surviving to the second period, 𝑝2 to the third and 𝑝3 of surviving for all the three 
periods. Than the representative household creating children maximize the following 
problem:10 
 
𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑝1𝑉(𝑐, 0,0) + 𝑝2𝑉(𝑐, 𝑛, 0) + 𝑝3𝑉(𝑐, 𝑛, ℎ)       (I.32) 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑓(𝑛, ℎ) + 𝑐 = 𝑦            (I.33) 
 
From the definition of the utility function given above, it is straightforward that a 
decrease in mortality leads to a relative increase in p3 and an increase in the level of 
expected utility. As a result, the reduction in mortality will decrease the relative cost of 
quality in a greater proportion than the reduction of the price of quantity of children in 
terms of goods. The implication is that lower mortality shifts parents' choices to higher 
quality descendants. Moreover, in order to account for the demographic transition, 
O'Hara (1975) suggests that its explanation lies in the response of parents to mortality 
decline; precisely, the demographic transition's reestablishment of a low population 
growth rate requires that parents choose a smaller quantity of children after a mortality 
decline. 
The second model considers, instead, a situation in which parents solve the 
following problem: 
 
                                                 
9 Actually the model does not make specific reference to the mortality issue, but it considers a model in 
which parents discriminate between male and female children in their utility function. The uncertainty 
is thus implied as far as the probability mass function of having a child of a certain gender is 
unknown, so that parents build expectations on it. 
10 Note that a fundamental assumption for all following results in the model is that the time distribution of 
Z and the household's wealth 𝑊 are independent on how long children survive. 
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𝑢[ℎ(𝑠, 𝑞)𝑛, 𝑐]             (I.34) 
 
Where 𝑠 is the indicator of child survival probability distribution, 𝑒 is the investment 
per child and 𝑞 its price.11 The budget constraint is expressed by: 
 
𝑞𝑛𝑠 + 𝑐 = 𝑦             (I.35) 
 
Where 𝑦 is total family income. Moreover, it considers two different and, under some 
specific assumptions, complementary types of child mortality responses, the hoarding 
(also known as precautionary demand for children) and the replacement phenomenon; 
the difference between those two is that the first one is the adaptation of fertility choices 
to expected levels of mortality, while the second relates to the experienced levels. Using 
Israel micro data, the Ben-Porath discovers that the replacement effect can be 
predominant in case expectations on high child mortality is not widespread, so that 
parents respond mainly to actual and experienced offspring losses; on the other side, if 
this common though is shared, the hoarding effect will be higher. 
Moving from the criticism to previous models,12 Sah (1991) develops a model in 
which a discrete fertility choice is considered. In particular, children survive according 
to a binomial density of the form: 
 
𝑏(𝑁, 𝑛, 𝜋) = (𝑛
𝑁
)𝜋𝑁(1 − 𝜋)𝑛−𝑁          (I.36) 
 
Where 𝑁 and 𝑛 are the integer number of born and surviving children respectively, and 
1 − 𝜋 is the mortality rate. The expected utility is derived from the number of surviving 
children, so that its functional form is given by: 
                                                 
11 Note that just consumption of parents is considered, while that for child is neglected in favour of their 
number per quality factor. 
12 The critique develops in three ways. First expected utility depends on expected surviving children (see 
Pen-Porath, 1972, 1976), but this would lead to undesired results and fundamental contradiction with 
what foreseen by choices under uncertainty theory. Another important point is about the limiting 
specification imposed on the utility function, which is a quadratic one (see Newman, 1988). Finally 
the polarization of the analysis by O'Hara (1975), according to which the only interesting outcomes 
are those two in which all children die or all survive. 
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𝑈(𝑛, 𝜋) = ∑ 𝑏(𝑁, 𝑛, 𝜋)𝑢(𝑁)𝑁           (I.37) 
 
Where 𝑢(𝑁) is the net utility from generating children. In fact it can be decomposed as 
a composite function of the difference between the parents benefit 𝑔(𝑁), as the 
happiness of giving birth, and the implied cost ℎ(𝑁), say the expenditure for child 
bearing; for optimality purpose and for complying with previous literature, 𝑔(𝑁) is 
assumed to be increasing and concave, while ℎ(𝑁) is increasing and convex. As a 
result, the optimality condition for n gives some important insights for the effect of a 
change in the mortality rate (1 − 𝜋). In fact, just computing the cross derivative with 
respect to 𝑛 and 𝜋 it is possible to discover that the optimal fertility function 𝑛(𝜋 is 
locally non increasing) is an increasing function of the mortality rate. 
Another interesting paper that investigates the relationship between fertility and 
child mortality is Kalemli-Ozcan (2002). Starting from Sah (1991) survival function and 
Kalemli-Ozcan (2000), the author develops a quality-quantity tradeoff model in which 
mortality is uncertain;13 in particular, it is assumed to have an OLG model where 
individuals live for two periods, whose expected utility function is given by: 
 
𝐸𝑡(𝑈𝑡) = (1 − 𝛼) ln(𝐶𝑡) + 𝛼𝐸𝑡{ln[𝑛𝑡𝑤ℎ𝑡+1]}        (I.38) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
The survival probability is modelled on the one offered by Sah (1991), so that it can be 
represented in its binomial form. 
The results of this model fit quite well with the main features of demographic 
transition; precisely, an exogenous decrease in child mortality will induce a quality-
quantity tradeoff in the economy. Owing to this, in developing countries where child 
mortality is very high, its decline will determine an increase in fertility. However, if 
returns on human capital are relevant and mortality is quite low (those are typical 
                                                 
13 The author proves that the condition without uncertainty is pointless, as any exogenous decline in 
mortality will not affect either fertility of human capital investment (what the author calls the mean 
effect). However, the increase in the survival probability will certainly cause an increase in the 
population growth rate. 
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characteristics of developed countries), then the investment in child quality will become 
more attractive at the expense of fertility (and even the population growth rate may 
decrease if not becoming negative under some condition on education returns). Kalemli-
Ozcan (2003) simply incorporated the same framework in a general equilibrium model. 
An interesting extension of the model is offered by Fernàndez-Villaverde (2001). 
The peculiarity of this model is to fit qualitatively and quantitatively with the main 
features of demographic transition thanks to the compliance with the possibility of 
facing capital-specific technological change and capital-skill complementarity; in 
particular a continuous of household living for four periods is assumed, whose utility 
function is given by: 
 
𝑉𝑡(𝑐𝑡+1
𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡+2
𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡+3
𝑡 , 𝑉𝑡+1) = 𝑢(𝑐𝑡+1
𝑡 ) + 𝛽𝐸𝑢(𝑐𝑡+2
𝑡 ) + 𝛽2𝐸(𝑐𝑡+3
𝑡 ) + 𝑏(𝑛𝑡)𝐸𝑉𝑡+1   (I.39) 
0 < 𝑏(𝑛𝑡) < 1  
 
Where 𝑐𝑡+1
𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡+2
𝑡  and 𝑐𝑡+3
𝑡  are consumption in the first, second and third period 
respectively, while 𝑉𝑡+1 is the children future level of welfare and 𝑏(𝑛𝑡) the respective 
altruism factor toward children. About the budget constraint, it is assumed that 
individuals earn an unskilled wage 𝑤𝑢 plus a skilled wage 𝑤𝑠 for any unit of human 
capital endowment; moreover, they are allowed to purchase an 𝑎𝑗 amount of non-
contingent bond at time j, if they die before adulthood, their positive position is 
redistributed through a lump-sum 𝑡𝑟𝑗 to all the adults in the economy. Hence the 
constraints can be presented in the following form: 
 
(1 + 𝑘1 + 𝑘2𝑠𝑡
𝑡)𝑐𝑡+1
𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡+1
𝑡 = (𝑤𝑡+1
𝑠 ℎ𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡+1
𝑢 )𝑙𝑡+1
𝑡 + 𝑡𝑟𝑡+1     (I.40) 
𝑐𝑡+2
𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡+2
𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡+2
𝑠 ℎ𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡+2
𝑢 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡+2)𝑎𝑡+1
𝑡 + 𝑡𝑟𝑡+2      (I.41) 
𝑐𝑡+3
𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑡+3)𝑎𝑡+2
𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡+3          (I.42) 
𝑙𝑡+1
𝑡 = (1 − 𝑒𝑡+1𝑠1𝑡𝑛𝑡)          (I.43) 
𝑙𝑗
𝑡 ∈ [0,1]  
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Where 𝑟𝑗 is the interest rate at time 𝑗 and 𝑞𝑗 is the capital tecnology factor. Using this 
framework, the author finds that the transmission mechanism proposed before does not 
fit with the fact of demographic transition; moreover an empirical test to support this 
hypothesis is provided. 
A fundamental distinction between different types of young mortality is implicitly 
pointed out by Mateos-Planas (2002). In order to explain it, just assume an economy in 
which people lives for two periods and the survival probability between those two is 
represented by 𝑠; if a certain individual dies in the youth period (whose probability is 
obviously 1 − 𝑠), than there is a probability γ that he has generated children before 
dying. Finally assume that the expected utility function of each single household is 
given by: 
 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝐸[𝑐𝑡
𝜎 + 𝛽𝑛𝑡
1−𝜀𝑉𝑡|𝑡 − 1]          (I.44) 
0 < 𝛽 < 1 , 0 < 𝜎 < 1 , 𝜀 < 1  
 
Where 𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑡 is the welfare of children; note that this form is nothing other than what 
offered by Barro and Becker (1989) under uncertainty assumption. The model focuses 
on the effect of longevity on the accumulation of physical capital, but it contains some 
interesting insights as far as the relationship between mortality and fertility is 
concerned; in particular, it is proven that a local increase in the parameter γ will tend to 
decrease the fertility rate 𝑛. Moreover, an increase in the survival probability will 
generally tend to increase the same parameter γ, so that, in the end, it is possible to state 
than a decrease in the mortality rate (especially at non infant ages, say near to the 
transition of an individual from the first to the second period) will tend to depress 
fertility. 
In order to make the Becker-Barro model fit the facts, Doepke (2004) augments it 
with some realistic assumptions in order to study the effect of child mortality on 
fertility. Precisely, he studies three different formulations of the model: in the first one 
he presents it in the form proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003), so that utility 
function is given by: 
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𝑉𝑡(𝑐𝑡, 𝑉𝑡+1) =
𝑐𝑡
1−𝜎
1−𝜎
+ 𝛼(𝑛𝑡)
𝜀𝑉𝑡+1         (I.45) 
0 < 𝛽 < 1  
 
Where 𝑐𝑡 is 𝛼 is the parental altruism and 𝑉𝑡+1 is the level of children welfare. Given 
the absence of uncertainty, the number of surviving children 𝑛 = 𝜋𝑁, where b is the 
total number of children and s is the survival rate. The budget constraint is given by: 
 
𝑤 ≤ (𝑝 + 𝑞𝑠)𝑁 + 𝑐𝑡            (I.46) 
 
Where 𝑝 is the cost of giving a child birth, 𝑞 is the additional cost for the fraction of 
survived children and 𝑠 is the deterministic probability for children to survive. The 
results associated to this specification are that if non-survived children are costless, then 
fertility is a decreasing function of the survival probability, while the contrary holds in 
the opposite case. 
The second formulation takes into consideration the stochastic mortality issue, in 
the same way in which Sah (1991), Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) (2003), so that a binomial 
mortality rate is taken into consideration. The only result associated to this specification 
is just that, if non-survived children are costless, then fertility is non-increasing in the 
child survival probability. 
Finally, the third model considers a sequential fertility framework (see also Sah 
(1991) and Wolpin, 1997),14 which means that parents live for T periods and decide the 
number of birth according to the number of survived older children, provided they 
procreate before a certain period K (as they are not fecund afterwards). Assuming that a 
child that survives for the second period will surely reach adulthood and denoting by 𝑏𝑡 
the number of birth at period t, by yt the number of young children (born in the previous 
period, so they can still experience child mortality) and nt the number of older offspring. 
The recursive definition of the probability of having children in different time periods 
                                                 
14 In Sah’s model, costs accrue only to surviving children, there is no limit to fecundity, and children 
survive for sure once they make it through the first period. Wolpin (1997) analyses a three-period 
model (and employs a multi-period version for estimation) which allows for differential survival of 
infants and children and limits fecundity to the first two periods. 
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(𝑃𝑡(ℎ𝑡)) leads to the formulation of the following maximization problem: 
 
max{𝑏𝑡}𝑡=0𝑇 [
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑡
(𝑤−𝑝𝑏𝑡(ℎ𝑡)−𝑞𝑦𝑡)
1−𝜎
1−𝜎
𝑃𝑡(ℎ𝑡) + 𝛽∑ 𝑛
𝜀𝑉𝑃(𝑛)𝑁𝑛=0ℎ𝑡∈𝐻𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=0 ]   (I.47) 
 
Where ℎ𝑡 = {𝑛𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡}, 𝐻𝑡 is a binary function that lets the individual chose whether to 
give a child birth or not at time 𝑡. The result associated to this formulation is that, if 
non-survived children are costless, then the number of children that will reach 
adulthood (𝑏𝑡(ℎ𝑡)𝑠𝑖) is non-increasing in their probability to survive for the first period 
(𝑠𝑖, hence fertility in decreasing). Note that in both stochastic frameworks, fertility turns 
out to be a decreasing function of the survival rate. 
Finally, the exogenous mortality framework is integrated with social norms 
concerning fertility by Bhattacharya and Chakraborty (2012); precisely, by social norms 
the authors mean that families will decide for their own fertility choices basing the 
process on a family-size ideal existing in the social environment in which they live. 
Aiming to effectively explain the empirical regularity according to which a reduction in 
child mortality is preceded by a fall in net and total fertility, the authors assume a utility 
function in the following form: 
 
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑛) = (1 − 𝛼) ln(𝑐) + 𝛼 ln(𝜋𝑁) − 𝛾𝜔(𝑑𝑛)      (I.48) 
𝛾 > 0 , 0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Where 𝑁 is the total fertility rate, 𝑠 is the survival probability,  𝑑𝑛 ≡ |𝑛 − 𝑛𝑠| is the 
“penalty function”,15 and 𝑛𝑠 is the ideal family size. Children are supposed to bring 
some costs, 𝛽, only if they survive at birth, so that the budget constraint will be 
represented by: 
 
𝑐 + 𝜋𝛽𝑁 = 𝑦             (I.49) 
 
Given this specification, it is proven that a reduction in child mortality will negatively 
                                                 
15 It is called penalty function as 𝜔 is assumed to be an increasing function and the function 𝑑𝑛 is an 
increasing function of the deviation from the social ideal 𝑛𝑠. 
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affect both total an net fertility rate, and this will work better as larger the family-size 
ideal is, and this can is acknowledged to be a very powerful child and population 
control policy. 
Building on the idea proposed by Bhattacharya and Chakraborty (2012) of social 
norms, Canning, Gunther, Linnemayr and Bloom (2013) developed a model in which 
parents derive their utility from their own consumption 𝑐𝑡, survival and total children, 
𝜋𝑡𝑛𝑡 and 𝑛𝑡, and the relation with other families in the same group  and 𝑛𝑡 − 𝑛𝑠, their 
offspring human capital endowment ℎ𝑡+1
𝐶  and their future wage 𝑤𝑡+1
𝐶 . The utility 
function is given by: 
 
𝑈(𝑐𝑡, 𝜋𝑡𝑛𝑡, ℎ𝑡+1
𝐶 ) = 𝑈1(𝑐𝑡) + 𝑈2(𝑛, ℎ𝑡+1
𝐶 , 𝑤𝑡+1
𝐶 ) + 𝑈3(𝑛𝑡, 𝑛𝑠)     (I.50) 
 
as in Fioroni (2010), the human capital accumulation process is the result of a joint 
effect by parental human capital ℎ𝑡
𝑃 and their investments in education 𝑒𝑡: 
 
ℎ𝑡+1
𝑐 = 𝜑(𝑒𝑡, ℎ𝑡
𝑃)            (I.51) 
 
parents bear an additional cost for each child born equal to 𝛽, so that the budget 
constraint is given by: 
 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 + 𝑤ℎ𝑡
𝑃(1 − (𝛽 + 𝑒𝑖)𝑛𝑖)          (I.52) 
 
Where 𝑚𝑡 is considered to be a non-labour income. Finally, the child survival 
probability function is the same as the one proposed by Sah (1991) and Kalemli-Ozcan 
(2002) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2003). In the end, the response of fertility to changes in 
child survival mortality depends crucially on the elasticity; in particular, if the elasticity 
of fertility to child mortality is below the value of -1, then there will be an increase in 
the total fertility rate, while the contrary will holds in the opposite situation.16 
 
 
                                                 
16 It is really straight forward that this conclusion allows for different responses across countries at least. 
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1.2.2 Endogenous mortality 
 
Notwithstanding a lot of strong empirical linkages between mortality and income per 
capita found by many works (see for example Yamada, 1985), all previous models deal 
with infant and child mortality as an exogenous variable, concentrating on comparative 
statics. On the other side, especially in the late 90's, many authors began to recognize 
the necessity to endogenize this aspect, owing to its relevant impact on fertility choices. 
In this sense, Blackburn and Cipriani (1998) develop a model in which infinity-
lived parents choose whether to invest their resources in the number of children n, in 
consumption c, or in health expenditure in order to increase survival probability of their 
offspring (this way mortality is endogeneized). The model is based on the BB 
framework, further implemented in continuous time by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), 
so that the parents' utility function accounts for the family size 𝑁, the consumption 𝑐 
and the number of surviving children (𝑁 −𝑚): 
 
𝑈 = ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡[𝛼 ln(𝑁) + log(𝑐) + 𝜙 log(𝑁 −𝑚)]𝑑𝑡
∞
0
      (I.53) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Where 𝑁 is the number of a typical dynasty, and (𝑁 −𝑚) is the number of surviving 
children. The peculiarity of this model is the possibility for parents to influence the 
mortality phenomenon, so that 𝑚 is defined as: 
 
𝑚 = 𝑀𝜇 (
𝜍
𝑘
,
𝑋
𝐾
) = 𝑀𝜇(𝜀, 𝜒)           (I.54) 
 
Where 𝜍 is the expenditure per child, 𝑘 is stock of capital per person, 𝑋 is the ratio of 
public health expenditure and 𝐾 is the aggregate level of capital; the function governing 
the mortality rate is decreasing and convex in both argument. The optimization process 
brings to a negative relation between income per capita and fertility and income per 
capita and mortality, while it turns out to be positive between income and child 
expenditure (which in turn lowers mortality, ceteris paribus). As a result the 
specification of the model brings to a positive impact of child mortality on fertility 
behaviour. 
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A very interesting extension of the previous result is achieved by Cigno (1998). 
The model develops under two different hypothesis. The first is that parents believe that 
infant mortality is totally exogenous and they cannot do anything to reduce it; owing to 
its framework, the results are similar to those found in the works of Sah (1991) and 
Blackburn and Cipriani (1998), so that mortality and fertility go in the same direction. 
In the other situation, there is an assumption about the parents' belief to positively affect 
child probability to survive through, say, sanitation and nutrition. In light of this 
situation, Cigno endogenizes child mortality m and deals with a household maximizing 
the following expected utility: 
 
𝐸(𝑈) = 𝑢(𝑐) + ∫ 𝑓(𝑛,𝑁, 𝛽 + 𝜍, 𝑠)
𝑁
0
𝑑𝑛 = 𝑢(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑁, 𝜈, 𝑠)     (I.55) 
 
Where 𝛽 and 𝜍 are the time and health care cost incurred by parents to rise a child and 
𝑠 = 1 − 𝜋 is the survival rate, or better the mean of the survival probability distribution. 
Note first that the probability for children to survive is left to the realization of a certain 
random variable whose distribution is represented by the function 𝑓(𝑛, 𝑁, 𝛽 + 𝜍, 𝑠). 
Second, and much more important, it is assumed that the perceived density of 𝑛 is 
conditional on 𝛽, 𝑁 and 𝑠.17 According to the constrained maximization principle and 
the concavity of the value function it is possible to discover that the model can generate 
both positive and negative correlation between fertility and child mortality. In particular, 
when the probability for offspring to survive is high, then the gain derived from the 
increase in the marginal utility of an additional child the increase in that parameter s. 
This framework is capable of explain the sentence by Demeny (1968) and the concept 
of demographic transition. In developing countries infant mortality is generally very 
high, so that an exogenous reduction in the average survival probability drives a higher 
fertility and a higher investment in child education and health (𝜈), reinforcing the fall in 
𝑚. While the country is developing, the negative effect of child mortality on fertility 
tends to vanish in favour of a positive one, which denotes the situation of developed 
countries. This result is generalized for any utility function form by Momota and 
Futagami (2000). 
                                                 
17 Remember that in the case in which parents thing they cannot affect the mortality rate the parameter 
s=1-m is a constant. 
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In the same direction, Gómez (2001) analyses the effect of a health subsidy to 
reduce child mortality and one for the reduction of child rearing cost: dealing with 
infant mortality, this question comes out to be fundamental, especially when parental 
altruism is taken into account. In fact, the basic immediate impacts of those policies 
would be of increasing the total level of human capital endowment, which will 
positively affect the parents' utility function (that is the case of child rearing cost 
subsidy) or to increase the time span through which parents can derive utility by their 
children's welfare (that is the case of health subsidy).18 Hence the convenience for 
policy-makers whether to provide one of the two forms of subsidies is not 
predetermined, as both seems to have a positive impact on societal welfare. In order to 
answer this question, the author develops the ideas formulated by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) and Blackburn and Cipriani (1998), so that the household's utility 
function is expressed as: 
 
𝑈 = ∫ 𝑒−𝛼𝑡{𝜓 ln(𝑁) + ln(𝑐 + 𝜑𝑔) + 𝜙ln (𝑛 − 𝑑(
∞
0
ĝ)}dt      (I.56) 
 
Where 𝑔 is the per capita health expenditure, and 𝑑(ĝ) is the family mortality rate; in 
particular, the mortality rate function 𝑑(ĝ) is assumed to be positive, monotonically 
decreasing and convex (diminishing returns to health expenditure). 
Both health and child rearing policies can be financed through a capital income or 
consumption tax; the choice does not affect the impact of the introduction of child 
bearing subsidies (it tends to lower fertility in favour of higher human capital, see the 
previous paragraph on the quality-quantity tradeoff), but it is decisive in case of public 
health support. In fact, in case the policy is based on a consumption tax, the fertility rate 
will decline in the long run, while in case of a capital income tax, the fertility rate will 
exhibit a reversed hump-shaped behaviour, so that it will increase in the long run.19 
                                                 
18 This can have various forms, it can take into account the level of children's utility, or the level of human 
capital per child, or even the total level of human capital. All these specifications are attached with 
different degrees of altruism, from a pure one to and impure one and selfishness (when it is considered 
only parents' consumption). 
19 The net effect on population size will be positive in any case, as an increase in longevity will increase 
the cohort size, although offspring size may shrink. 
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An interesting analysis on the mortality factors is offered by Stulik (2004). In 
particular the author distinguished a completely external force driven by uncontrollable 
phenomena 𝑆, say the weather condition or geography,20 and an endogenous one 
controlled through health expenditure. The utility function is expressed in a general 
form and depends on consumption in the two periods of individuals’ life {𝑐1, 𝑐2}, on the 
number of surviving children 𝑠𝑁 and on their quality ℎ:  
 
𝑈 = 𝑏1 ln(𝑐1) + 𝑏2 ln(𝑐2) + 𝑏3 ln(𝑠𝑁) + 𝑏4 ln(𝑒 + ℎ)      (I.57) 
𝑏3 > 𝑏4  
 
Where 𝑒 is the investment in children education. Assuming 𝑧 is the time cost of rearing 
children and given the two-period life, the budget constraint results in the following 
form: 
 
𝑐1 = [1 − (𝑧 + 𝜍 + ℎ)𝑁 − 𝜗]𝑤          (I.58) 
𝑐2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝜗𝑤             (I.59) 
 
𝜍 is the part of income voluntary spend for children health, 𝜗 is the saving for old age 
consumption and 𝑟 and 𝑤 are the interest  and the wage rate. The survival rate can be 
defined as a function of the expenditure in health through the following specification: 
 
𝑠 = min(1, 𝑆 + (1 − 𝑆)𝜆𝜍)          (I.60) 
 
With 𝜆 > 0. Reasonably, there will be a positive relation between the survival rate and 
health expenditure, and in fact 
𝜕𝑠 
𝜕𝜍
= (1 − 𝑆)𝜆 > 0. The model concludes that, in the 
weather favouring country, income needed in order to achieve an investment in children 
education will be much lower, because the survival rate will be enough low will a small 
fraction of resources spent in reducing child mortality. On the other side, in the worse 
                                                 
20 The lower life expectancy at birth in tropical areas has been empirically proven by many authors, 
among all Bloom and Sachs (1998); the result is robust to income controls. 
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weather condition country, parents will dedicate the largest part, if not the totality, of 
their resources in reducing child mortality, as its high value and the assumption on 
𝑏3 and 𝑏4 will permit the marginal benefit of investing in child health care to be strictly 
higher than the one deriving from investment in schooling. 
 An entirely different result is reached by Azarnet (2006). The main difference 
with the previous framework is to consider mortality as dependent on the relation 
between parental human capital and sanitation investments, and not on their health 
expenditure; moreover, infant death is considered (children die only before any 
educational process has been incurred), so that a decline in child mortality leads to a 
decrease in the level of education. In particular individuals derive utility from their 
consumption at adulthood 𝑐𝑡 and from their children total income 𝑦𝑡+1: 
 
𝑈𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼) ln(𝑐𝑡) + 𝛼 ln(𝑦𝑡+1
𝑁 )         (I.61) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Adults are endowed with a human capital level ℎ𝑡, and they can employ it for child 
rearing or working (gaining a wage 𝑤); offspring raising costs are distinguished in time 
and goods expenses for growing 𝑧1 and cost related with surviving children education 
time 𝑧2. Given that the number of births is 𝑛𝑡, the survival probability is 𝜋𝑡 and the 
expenditure in children human capital can be expressed by 𝑒𝑡, the budget constraint will 
look like the following: 
 
𝑐𝑡 +𝑤[𝑧1ℎ𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡(𝑧2ℎ𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡)]𝑛𝑡 ≤ 𝑤ℎ𝑡         (I.62) 
 
to complete the framework, the author considers a children income function of the 
following form: 
 
𝑦𝑡+1
𝑁 = 𝜋𝑡𝑤ℎ𝑡+1𝑛𝑡            (I.63) 
 
and a survival probability function: 
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𝜋𝑡 = {
(𝜈1ℎ𝑡)
1
𝛼  , 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑡 <
1
𝜈1
 
     1       ,        𝑖𝑓  ℎ𝑡 ≥
1
𝜈1
          (I.64) 
 
the result of the model is that timing of child mortality is crucial for the determination 
of its impact on fertility. If infant mortality is taken into consideration, an exogenous 
decline will imply a reduction in fertility and education, but population will grow faster; 
however, this reduction in education will negatively affect human capital accumulation 
and long run growth, leading to the absorption of the exogenous fall in mortality. 
Finally, if parental investment in schooling became more productive, than human capital 
rising could eliminate child mortality in the long run. 
 Building on the basic framework by Stulik (2004) and the distinction between an 
exogenous and an endogenous mortality factor,21 Stulik (2008) offers an explanation of 
the inverted u-shaped behaviour expressed by the delayed response of fertility to 
declines in mortality. This question is particularly important to understand the 
fundamental meaning of higher fertility rates in countries in which weather conditions 
lead to a very high child mortality. A standard two-period living individual is 
considered, and parents can partially affect mortality rates via child-care investments. 
First of all a subsistence consumption 𝑐𝑠𝑢𝑏 is considered, so that a level of consumption 
𝑐 < 𝑐𝑠𝑢𝑏 basically leads to an infinitively negative utility; second, parents derive utility 
from the expenditure in children health 𝜈:22 
 
𝑢(𝑐, 𝑠𝑛, 𝑑) = log(𝑐 − 𝑐𝑠𝑢𝑏) + 𝛽1 log(𝑁𝑠(𝑆, 𝜍)) + 𝛽2log (𝜍)      (I.65) 
 
Where 𝑠 is the survival rate composed by an observed (or extrinsic) part 𝑆 and parental 
health expenditure for children 𝜍. While the survival probability function draws directly 
from the basic framework, the budget constraint assumes a much simpler form: 
 
                                                 
21 In the paper those two components are respectively called extrinsic and intrinsic; while the first one 
deals with the latitude of a certain Country, the second takes into consideration child health 
expenditure. 
22 This might be interpreted as a “joy of giving” phenomenon, although it is not a properly bequest. 
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𝑦 = 𝑐 + 𝑁𝜍𝑦             (I.66) 
 
Where 𝑦 represents total income. Results are in line with what presented in the basic 
model; in general, there is a non-empty set of preferences according to which the worse 
condition country exhibits a higher fertility rate, and this situation is more likely to 
emerge as technological progress is lower and land is a more crucial factor of 
production.23 
 An interesting departure from what proposed in previous models is contained in 
Fioroni (2010), who studies the impact of child mortality reductions on fertility in 
different educational systems; starting from the idea of child mortality offered by 
Azarnet (2006) and a linear production function, the author considers individuals whose 
utility function is expressed in the following form: 
 
𝑈𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼) log(𝑐𝑡
𝑖) + 𝛼 log( 𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑁𝑡
𝑖ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 )       (I.67) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Where 𝑠𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑠(ℎ𝑡
𝑖) is the survival probability function.24 
 Under a private education system, parents provide schooling for surviving 
children and the budget constraint will be given by: 
 
𝑐𝑡
𝑖 = ℎ𝑡
𝑖 (1 −
𝜈𝑁𝑡
𝑖
𝑠(ℎ𝑡
𝑖)
) − 𝑒𝑡
𝑖𝑁𝑡
𝑖           (I.68) 
 
while the human capital accumulation process: 
 
ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 = (𝜃 + 𝑒𝑡
𝑖)𝜀(ℎ𝑡
𝑖)1−𝜀           (I.69) 
 
Where 𝑒𝑡
𝑖 is nothing other than the education expenditure. 
 Instead, under a public education system, the government levies a proportional tax 
                                                 
23 Note that these conclusions depict the so called “Malthusian World”. 
24 As usual, 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕ℎ𝑡
𝑖 > 0. 
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on all adults and provides children a common schooling level 𝑒𝑡, so that the budget 
constraint is: 
 
𝑐𝑡
𝑖 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡)ℎ𝑡
𝑖 (1 −
𝜈𝑁𝑡
𝑖
𝑠(ℎ𝑡
𝑖)
)           (I.70) 
 
however, we should even consider the Government budget constraint: 
 
𝑒𝑡 ∑ 𝑛𝑡
𝑖 =
𝑃𝑡
𝑖=1 ∑ ℎ𝑡
𝑖𝑃𝑡
𝑖=1 𝜏𝑡 (1 −
𝜈𝑁𝑡
𝑖
𝑠(ℎ𝑡
𝑖)
)          (I.71) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑡 is the total population at time 𝑡. The accumulation process for human capital 
is assumed in the following form: 
 
ℎ𝑡+1
𝑖 = (𝜃 + 𝑒𝑡)
𝜀(ℎ𝑡
𝑖)1−𝜀           (I.72) 
 
As a result under a private education system, if income is low initially, the economy 
converges to a Malthusian stagnation steady state. For a high level of initial income, the 
economy reaches a growth path in which children’s education rises and fertility 
decreases with income. In the growth regime under private education, exogenous shocks 
that lower child mortality are detrimental for growth: fertility increases and education 
declines. In contrast, under a public education system, the stagnation steady state does 
not exist, and health improvement shocks are no longer detrimental for growth. 
 
 
1.3 Social security 
 
Overlapping Generations Models are particularly suitable for analysing the effects of 
the introduction of social security and pensions systems; in fact, if we assume that one 
cohort of people is young and productive while another one is old cannot work, it 
becomes quite natural to think about the first one offering resources to the second one to 
finance its consumption. This particular social security setting is called unfunded or 
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pay-as-you go system, as resources are levied, generally on some particular choices 
taken during adulthood (labour supply, cost of having children or consumption), right 
when they are spent for transfers. An alternative, although less common in reality, it to 
impose a labour tax on the same generation that receive resources back via pensions in 
the future, creating a transfer of resources under the form of constrained savings; this 
different setting is called funded social security system. The basic requirement for a 
social contract is respected in this Government managed plan as it can surely ensure the 
current working generation that the same treatment would be followed in the next 
period, so that they can take advantage of it as well. 
As already specified in previous paragraph, there are several motives to have 
children, and, in general, some of these motives characterize specific development eras 
of the economy. While it is quite evident, from what written so far, that a form of 
private interest in investing in children’s human capital to enhance their future welfare 
is more likely to be adopted in developed countries, some other forces may rule the 
choice of a developed and underdeveloped household. Hence, in the following 
paragraph we will deal with the effects induced by the introduction of funded and 
unfunded social security systems in an environment in which parents show altruism 
(according to various degrees) toward children. In the following part, we will treat 
works on the study and comparison between two different attitudes of parents in 
demanding children, altruism and selfishness. 
 
 
 1.3.1 Funded and Unfunded Systems 
 
One of the first works to tackle the intergenerational resources transfer system and 
shifting of consumption from productive to non-productive periods is Razin and Ben-
Zion (1975). Assuming an intergenerational utility function of the following additive 
and time separable form: 
 
𝑈𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼
𝑡𝑈(𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡+1
2 , 𝑛𝑡)
∞
𝑡=0           (I.73) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
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Where 𝑐𝑡
1 and 𝑐𝑡+1
2  are the consumption during the middle-age and old age period 
respectively. The budget constraint will be given by: 
 
𝑛𝑡𝑘𝑡+1 = 𝑓 [𝑘𝑡 − (𝑐𝑡
1 −
𝑐𝑡+1
2
𝑛𝑡−1
)]          (I.74) 
 
Note that in this simple case, the pension is assumed to be paid in kind, so that it is 
exactly equal to the old-age consumption, 𝑐𝑡+1
2 . As a result, it can be shown that fertility 
depends positively on the amount of resources shifted to old generations. 
Another interesting contribution is offered by Eckstein and Wolpin (1985), which 
compare the endogenously determined fertility level in a competitive economy to the 
fertility level that maximizes the steady state utility of a representative agent. Assuming 
that individuals derive utility from own consumption in middle and old age, 𝑐𝑡
1 and 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 ,  and from own children, 𝑛𝑡: 
 
𝑈 = 𝑉(𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡+1
2 , 𝑛𝑡)            (I.75) 
 
They show that the optimal steady state utility (the one endogenously determined by 
individuals) yields a higher population growth rate when it converges to the Golden 
Rule allocation (the one determined by the social planner); this difference in fertility 
choices between the social planner and the decentralized economy case is an 
inefficiency. According to Samuelson (1958), this inefficiency can be absorbed by the 
introduction of a social security system based on the voluntary transfer of resource 
across generations; suppose, for instance, that the young generation gives up 𝜏𝑡 units of 
wealth in favour of the old generation, but it supposes to receive 𝜏𝑡+1 in the next period. 
Hence, assuming CRS production function 𝐹(𝐾𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑡+1), imagine the Government 
implements a self-financed social security system in order to internalize the effect of 
individual decisions on fertility, so that the rate of return should be equal to the rate of 
fertility 𝑛𝑡; if this were the case, the budget constraint will be given by: 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 = 𝑤𝑡 + 𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝜏𝑡 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)          (I.76) 
41 
 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 = 𝐹(𝐾𝑡+1, 𝐿𝑡+1) − 𝑤𝑡+1𝐿𝑡+1 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+1 + (1 + 𝑛𝑡)𝜏𝑡+1    (I.77) 
 
Where 𝐾𝑡+1 is the physical capital saved for production in the next period, 𝛽 is the cost 
of rising children, 𝐿𝑡+1 is labour supply and 𝛿 is the depreciation rate of physical 
capital. An alternative policy would be to place a tax or subsidy on children financed by 
a lump-sum transfer between generations; however the optimal tax would need to be 
known by the government since such a program would not be voluntary. 
 Although the correlation between old-age provision and fertility is weak and often 
contradictory (Nelissen and van den Akker 1988; Swidler 1986; Nugent 1985), many 
other authors gave their contribution for understanding this relation in an altruistic 
model. For instance, Prinz (1990) proposed an OLG framework in which social 
securities are introduced in order to achieve the social optimum that characterizes a 
situation of mutual altruism. Hence assuming altruistic parents solving the following 
maximization problem: 
 
max
(𝑐𝑡
1,𝑐𝑡+1
2 ,𝑐𝑡+1
1 ,𝑘𝑡+1,𝑛𝑡)
𝑈(𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡+1
2 ) + 𝛼𝑈(𝑐𝑡+1
1 , 𝑐𝑡+2
2 )       (I.78) 
 
𝑠. 𝑡   𝑐𝑡
1 ≤ 𝑤(1 − 𝜏𝑡) − 𝛽𝑛𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡 − 𝑘𝑡+1(1 + 𝑛𝑡) + 𝑘𝑡(1 + 𝑟)     (I.79) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 ≤ 𝑤𝜏𝑡+1 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡           (I.80) 
𝑐𝑡+1
1 ≤ (1 + 𝑛𝑡)[𝑤(1 − 𝜏𝑡) − 𝛽𝑛𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝑘𝑡+2(1 + 𝑛𝑡+1) + 𝑘𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟)]  (I.81) 
𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡+1
2 , 𝑐𝑡+1
1 ≥ 0            (I.82) 
 
Where 𝜏𝑡 and 𝜏𝑡+1 are the social security tax and subsidy for young and old generations 
respectively, 𝑠 is the total amount of savings while young and 𝑘 is the level of bequest 
left from parents to children. Note that in this case we have three fundamental budget 
constraints as individuals will have to maximize their own consumption 𝑐𝑡
1 and 𝑐𝑡+1
2 , 
and offsprings’ consumption 𝑐𝑡+1
1 . The result of the maximization process is a trade-off 
between the level of bequest 𝑘 and fertility, 𝑛, so that the positive impact of the labour 
tax 𝜏𝑡 on the first will determine a decline on fertility; however, in this framework, it 
does not seem to be any effect by the magnitude of positive transfers to old ages 𝜏𝑡+1. 
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An interesting contribution on the comparison between funded and unfunded 
social security systems is offered in Zhang (1995); in this paper, the author examines 
the effects of social security on the growth of per capita income in a model where 
investment in human capital of children is the engine of endogenous growth. Assuming 
a utility function of the following form: 
 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑈(𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡+1
2 , 𝑛𝑡) + 𝛼𝑉𝑡+1           (I.83) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Given bequests 𝑘𝑡 and 𝑘𝑡+1, a child rearing cost 𝛽 and a level of savings 𝑠𝑡, the budget 
constraint will be given by:25 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 = 𝑘𝑡 + [1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)]𝑤(1 − 𝑠𝑡)         (I.84) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡[1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)]𝑤 − 𝑘𝑡+1𝑛𝑡        (I.85) 
 
The introduction of an unfunded social security system will determine a resource 
transfer 𝜏𝑡+1 of the following magnitude: 
 
𝜏𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝑛𝑡−1)𝜏𝑡[1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)]𝑤         (I.86) 
 
Where 𝜏𝑡 is the flat tax rate on labour income. Hence, the new system of budget 
constraints is given by: 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 = 𝑘𝑡 + [1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)]𝑤(1 − 𝜏𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡)        (I.87) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡[1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)]𝑤 + 𝜏𝑡+1 − 𝑘𝑡+1𝑛𝑡      (I.88) 
 
                                                 
25 We’ve assumed the case of a small open economy, so that 𝑤 and 𝑟 are endogenously determined, just to 
simply the analysis in light our concern of focusing on impacts on fertility. This assumption is the 
same as the one used in Becker and Barro (1988). 
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As a result, unfunded social security may speed up per capita growth by reducing 
fertility and increasing the ratio of human capital investment per child to per family 
income when private intergenerational transfers are operative; this is due by the double 
effect of unfunded social securities on fertility. First, taxing labour income lowers the 
opportunity cost of spending time on rearing children by reducing the after-tax wage 
rates; second, transferring the tax revenue to the old increases bequests relative to 
income, and hence increases the cost of raising children, as pointed out by Becker and 
Barro (1988). Although private rates of return on human capital decrease because of the 
tax imposed on children future labour wage, the reduction of fertility is likely to offset 
this reduction in future income if 𝛼 is enough high.  
On the other side, the introduction of a funded social security system is mere 
delicate and demands for a further specification on the relation between generations. 
The first case to be analysed is that of assuming that receipts are linked to contribution, 
the new budget constraint will be given by:  
 
𝑐𝑡
1 = 𝑘𝑡 + [1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)]𝑤(1 − 𝜏𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡)        (I.89) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 = (1 + 𝑟)(𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡)[1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)]𝑤 − 𝑘𝑡+1𝑛𝑡      (I.90) 
 
In the other case, if we assume instead that receipts are not linked to contribution, the 
budget constraint setting will be equivalent to the Government budget will be given by: 
 
𝜏𝑡+1 = 𝜏𝑡[1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)]𝑤(1 − 𝑟)         (I.91) 
 
when voluntary saving is positive, a funded program is neutral in terms of fertility if 
receipts are linked to contributions, and most likely depresses per capita growth if 
receipts are independent of contributions. This difference is caused by the fact that when 
receipts are independent on contributions, agents are unable to realize the effects of their 
decisions on the return to the forced saving.  
Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001) has analysed the interaction of mortality decline, 
long-run growth and the provision of social security in an overlapping-generations 
endogenous growth model with actuarially fair capital markets. Assuming a utility 
function similar to that of Zhang and Casagrande (1998): 
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𝑉𝑡 = ln(𝑐𝑡
1) + 𝜂 ln(𝑐𝑡+1
2 ) + 𝜌 ln(𝑛𝑡) + 𝛼𝑉𝑡+1       (I.92) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
In period t, a middle-aged agent devotes 𝛽𝑛𝑡 units of time to rearing children, 𝜈𝑡𝑛𝑡 units 
of time to educating children, and work for the remaining time 𝑙𝑡 for a wage 𝑤. This 
agent receives a bequest with earned interest, 𝑘𝑡(1 + 𝑟), from the old-aged parent at the 
beginning of period 𝑡, and leaves a bequest, 𝑘𝑡+1, to each child at the end of period 𝑡, so 
that children receive bequests regardless of their parents’ survival status at old age. The 
middle-aged agent spends the earning and inheritance on own middle-age consumption 
𝑐𝑡
1, saving via actuarially fair annuity markets 𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑤, so that budget constraints are 
given by: 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 = 𝑘𝑡(1 + 𝑟) + 𝑙𝑡𝑤(1 − 𝑠𝑡) − 𝑘𝑡+1𝑛𝑡        (I.93) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑡𝑤 𝜌⁄            (I.94) 
 
Given this, the impact of social security systems is studied. Without social security or 
with fully funded social security, if parents value the number of children more than the 
welfare of children (𝜌 > 𝛼), a rise in life expectancy reduces fertility (hence population 
aging comes both from longer life and from lower fertility), stimulates human capital 
investment and per capita growth. If parents value children welfare more than the 
number of children, a rise in life expectancy raises fertility (and hence has an 
ambiguous effect on population aging), reduces human capital investment and slows 
down per capita growth. If parents value the number of children as strongly as their 
welfare, a rise in life expectancy has no effect at all on fertility, investments and growth, 
even though saving and bequests may account for different proportions of physical 
capital investment. When unfunded social security is considered, a rise in life 
expectancy raises the social security contribution rate and has in general ambiguous 
effects on fertility, human capital investment and growth. An interesting result in this 
case is that a rise in life expectancy tends to have a negative effect on fertility and 
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positive effects on human capital investment, growth, and the social security 
contribution rate for a wide range of plausible parameter values. 
An interesting development of Zhang and Zhang (1995) framework is offered by 
Yakita (2001). In particular, the author focuses on efficient capital and private annuities 
markets in the presence of lifetime uncertainty; assuming a weak altruism of parents 
toward their children à la Eckstein and Wolpin (1985): 
 
𝑈 = log(𝑐𝑡
1) + 𝛼 log(1 + 𝑛𝑡) +
1−𝜆
1−𝑝
log (𝑐𝑡+1
2 )       (I.95) 
 
Where 𝜆 is the probability for adults to die before retirement. The economy is composed 
by one-sector endogenous growth model which includes externalities from physical 
capital. The main conclusion is that an increase in life expectancy lowers the fertility 
rate and increases savings for consumption during retirement. In a growing economy, 
social security financed on a pay-as-you-go basis seems to raise the fertility rate and 
decrease life-cycle savings when elderly parents do not get support from their children, 
since it redistributes income from working generations to retired generations. However, 
it is shown that any social security system, regardless of its contribution rate, will not 
reverse the effects of an increase in life expectancy on the fertility rate and on per-capita 
growth which would occur even in its absence. 
 On the side of social security systems programming, Groezen, Leers and Meijdam 
(2003) proposed a framework in order to claim that pay-as-you-go schemes and child 
allowance policies are “Siamese Twins”. Starting from the work by Eckstein and 
Wolpin (1985), they analyse the optimal fertility choice of an individual maximizing the 
following utility function: 
 
𝑈 = log(𝑐𝑡
1) + 𝛼 log(𝑛𝑡) + 𝜃 log (𝑐𝑡+1
2 )         (I.96) 
 
Assuming that the Government is not present in the economy and denoting as 𝛽 and 𝑠𝑡 
the child rearing cost and the level of saving by young generations, the individuals’ 
budget constraint can be represented by: 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 + 𝛽𝑛𝑡 = 𝑤 − 𝑠𝑡            (I.97) 
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𝑐𝑡+1
2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡            (I.98) 
 
The authors show that this maximization process will lead to a Pareto efficient 
allocation, regardless of what shown by Cigno (1993). 
Instead, if a social security system is engineered by the Government, it should be 
accompanied by a child allowance program in order to achieve the same First-Best 
solution. Hence, assuming a pension system that transfers 𝜏𝑡 resources from the young 
generation to the old one through 𝜏𝑡+1 pensions; however, if this were the case, the 
economy will suffer the situation outlined by Cigno (1993), so that a child allowance 
program is needed. This policy is simply implemented by a subsidy 𝜑 aimed at reducing 
the cost of rising children 𝛽 financed by a lamp sum tax 𝜗𝑡. Hence the new budget 
constraint 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 + (𝛽 − 𝜑)𝑛𝑡 = 𝑤 − 𝜏𝑡 − 𝜗𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡         (I.99) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡+1                 (I.100) 
 
Hence, individuals will make the same fertility choice as the one characterized by the 
absence of the Government. This result is attained as the two externalities delineated by 
Cigno (1993) will perfectly cancel out each other. In fact, the benefit of an additional 
child for future output will be completely offset by the reduction of the capital–labour 
ratio (or per capita debt in a small open economy), so that parents who do not take these 
externalities into account are not likely to give birth to a (socially) suboptimal number 
of children. 
  An interesting reformulation of child allowances policies proposed by Groezen, 
Leers and Meijdam (2003) and uncertainty on the lifetime side is contained in Mochida 
(2005); in their model, the endogenous engine for growth is considered to be children 
human capital ℎ𝑡+1, influenced by parental investment 𝑒𝑡 in schooling and their human 
capital ℎ𝑡 á la Zhang and Casagrande (1998). Given this, altruistic parents will 
maximize the following utility funcation: 
 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝛾 ln(𝑐𝑡
1) + 𝛿𝜆 ln(𝑐𝑡+1
2 ) + 𝛼 ln(𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡+1)              (I.101) 
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Where 𝜆 is the survival probability coefficient. 
In the absence of bequest motives, individuals are willing to invest their assets in such 
insurance, so that insurance companies promise individuals a payment of 
(1+𝑟)
𝜆
𝑎𝑡, where 
𝑟 is the interest rate, is  in exchange for having an estate 𝑎𝑡. 
Thanks to the Pay-as-you-go system, individuals will pay a tax rate 𝜏1 on working time 
and get a pension 𝜏2. Denoting by 𝑙𝑡 and 𝑤 the labour supply and its remuneration, by 𝛽 
and 𝜑 the (time) cost of rising children and the child allowance policy, the budget 
constraint will take the form of: 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 = (1 − 𝜏1)𝑤𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑡 − (𝛽 − 𝜑)𝑛𝑡 − 𝑎𝑡               (I.102) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 =
(1+𝑟)
𝜆
𝑎𝑡 + 𝜏2                  (I.103) 
 
As a result, the introduction of a child-allowance policy and a PAYG pension system 
increases the number of children and decreases the labour time; moreover, when child 
allowances are given to parents depending on the number of children, parents have an 
incentive to increase the “quantity” of children without maintaining the “quality” of 
each child. 
Instead when the government introduces the PAYG-pension system only, the 
introduction has no effects on the education time per child and the per-capita growth 
rate. 
 In line with what Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003) discovered, Gavhary 
(2009) found that fertility externalities can be internalized through a child allowance (or 
tax) or a linkage between pension benefits and the number of children. In fact, it is often 
argued that in the presence of a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security system, there is 
a positive externality associated with having children which, if not corrected, implies 
that the number of children in a decentralized economy would be suboptimal. At the 
same time, it is also argued that a declining fertility will shrink the tax base and 
undermine the financial solvency of the PAYGO pension systems. To counter this, 
many economists have recently advocated a policy of linking pension benefits, and/or 
contributions, to the number of children (see Bental, 1989 and Fenge and Meier, 2005). 
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The peculiarity of this model is that of introducing parents’ heterogeneity in the cost of 
rising children; hence two groups of individuals will be considered and they will be 
denoted by the subscript 𝑗. 
Hence just assume that parental middle and old-age consumption, 𝑐1,𝑗 and 𝑐2,𝑗, and the 
number of their children, 𝑛, enter parents’ utility function in an additive and separable 
form. Now introducing parents heterogeneity, we can consider two categories, so that 𝛽𝑗 
and 𝑦𝑗 denote the cost of rising children and the steady state value of income for them. 
Finally suppose, instead, that the Government introduces a PAYG system in which 𝜏1,𝑗 
resources from the young cohort in favour of the old one as a pension 𝜏2,𝑗 and a child 
allowance 𝜑𝑗, so that the parental budget constraint can be represented in a compact 
form:26 
 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝜏1,𝑗 − 𝑐1,𝑗 +
𝑐2,𝑗−𝜏2,𝑗
1+𝑟
+ (𝛽𝑗 − 𝜑𝑗)𝑛𝑗               (I.104) 
 
Then, as in Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), this framework will lead to a Pareto 
efficient allocation. However, this prescription rest crucially on the assumption that no 
parents are better than others in raising their children and that fertility can be perfectly 
controlled. When either of these two assumptions are violated, the case for such policy 
recommendations are greatly weakened. 
 An interesting development on the side of child care and social security 
sustainability policies is offered by Hirazawa and Yakita (2009). In their model, the 
authors assume that children can be raised through parental time, 𝑧𝑡, or market provided 
services (like nurseries or baby-sitting), 𝑥𝑡, so that we can define a fertility function 𝑛𝑡: 
 
𝑛𝑡 = 𝜔(𝑧𝑡)
𝛾(𝑥𝑡)
1−𝛾                  (I.105) 
 
Given this, parents make their choices maximizing a utility function: 
 
𝑈 = log(𝑐𝑡
1) + 𝛼 log(𝑛𝑡) + 𝜃 log(𝑐𝑡+1
2 )                  (I.106) 
                                                 
26  Note that this setting requires the Government to recognize the two categories of parents in order to 
have optimality. 
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𝛼, 𝜃 ∈ (0,1)  
 
The existence of a PAYG system, by which 𝜏𝑡
1  resources are transferred from the 
young cohort in favour of the old one as a pension 𝜏𝑡+1
2 , gives a system of budget 
constraint of the following form: 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 + 𝑠𝑡 + 𝑥𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡
1)𝑤(1 − 𝑧𝑡)               (I.107) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 = 𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡+1
2                   (I.108) 
 
Where 𝑠𝑡 is the amount of savings gathered during working time period. 
In the standard case of children raised only with parents’ working time, an 
increase in the payroll tax rate 𝜏𝑡
1 means a decline in the after-tax wage rate and thereby 
induces individuals to increase parental child-rearing time 𝑧𝑡, thus reducing the labour 
supply. However, when individuals can substitute parental child care with market child 
care 𝑥𝑡, the increased parental child-rearing time does not necessarily result in an 
increase in the number of children (see Apps and Rees, 2004).  
In fact, the effect on fertility will depend on the joint effect of three factors. The 
first one is the standard intergenerational redistribution effect from the working 
generation to the retired generation through the social security system (depends on the 
difference between the interest rate and fertility). Then, the (implicit) subsidy effect 
through tax-exemption of child rearing at home (tends to reduce children demand as 
consumption goods, as (1 − 𝜏𝑡
1)𝑤(1 − 𝑧𝑡) is reduced). Finally, the price effect through 
changes in the relative price of market child care (raises the fertility rate through 
declines in the opportunity cost of child rearing when market child care is produced by 
using market goods). Thus, when the population growth rate is sufficiently high, the 
intergenerational redistribution effect is great enough to dominate the subsidy effect and 
increase full income. The positive income effect together with the price effect raises the 
fertility rate. 
At the same time, changes in the labour supply and fertility affect 
intergenerational income distribution through the social security scheme. Although 
increased parental child-rearing time tends to reduce tax revenue and hence social 
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security benefits, the increased tax rate raises the fertility rate if the standard effect of 
social security on the steady-state income is sufficiently great. The reduced after-tax 
wage rate also decreases the cost of children by making the price of market child care 
higher relative to the cost of parental child rearing, thereby exerting a positive effect on 
fertility. 
 Finally, a complete work on the relation between social security systems and 
fertility is offered by Ling Yew and Zhang (2013); in their model, the authors use social 
security and education subsidization to eliminate the efficiency losses of human capital 
externality for the social optimum in an endogenous growth model with fertility, life-
cycle saving and human capital investment. Assuming altruistic parents caring about 
middle and old-age consumption, 𝑐𝑡
1 and 𝑐𝑡+1
2 , and number of children, 𝑛𝑡: 
 
𝑉0 = ∑ 𝛼
𝑡𝑈(∞𝑡=0 𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡+1
2 , 𝑛𝑡)                          (I.109) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
 
Suppose that parents have a unit of time to allocate between child rearing and working 
for a wage 𝑤; the cost, in terms of time, for each child is 𝑧, so that the fertility upper 
bound 𝑁 =
1
𝑧
 and labour income is denoted by (1 − 𝜏𝑡
1)ℎ𝑡𝑤(1 − 𝑧𝑁), where 𝜏𝑡
1 is the 
social security financing flat tax and ℎ𝑡 is the level of parental human capital. Each 
parent will allocate labour income and bequest 𝑘𝑡 into consumption, savings for old age 
𝑠𝑡 and children education (1 − 𝑣𝑡)𝑒𝑡, where 𝑣𝑡 is the subsidization rate. Finally, an old 
parents will finance consumption with their own savings (capitalised at an interest rate 
𝑟), pension 𝜏𝑡+1
2  and leave an even bequest 𝑘𝑡+1 to all children. Hence the system of 
budget constraint is given by: 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 = 𝑘𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑡
1)ℎ𝑡𝑤(1 − 𝑧𝑁) − 𝑠𝑡 − (1 − 𝑣𝑡)𝑒𝑡𝑛𝑡            (I.110) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 = 𝑠𝑡(1 + 𝑟) + 𝜏𝑡+1
2 − 𝑘𝑡+1𝑛𝑡               (I.111) 
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On the side of human capital accumulation, authors assumed that it is the result of 
parents’ level of human capital ℎ𝑡, education investments and the externality given by 
the economy-wide average level of human capital, ℎ𝑡: 
 
ℎ𝑡+1 = ℎ(ℎ𝑡, 𝑒𝑡, ℎ𝑡)                           (I.112) 
 
As a result, education subsidization for a lower education cost appears to be an ideal 
means to tackle the under-investment and the over-reproduction caused by the 
externality. However, the accompanying tax on wage income counteracts the positive 
effect of education subsidization on human capital investment and the negative effect on 
fertility. 
The net effects of social security on fertility and on human capital investment depend on 
preferences. On the one hand, social security raises the time cost of children through the 
foregone earnings-dependent social security benefits, and raises the bequest cost to ease 
the increased tax burdens on children. On the other hand, the labour income tax for 
social security reduces both the time cost of a child and the return on human capital 
investment. 
If the taste for the welfare of children is sufficiently strong relative to the taste for the 
number of children, then the net effect of social security on fertility is negative, in line 
with the empirical evidence in Zhang and Zhang (2004). 
 
 
1.3.2 Altruism VS Selfishness 
 
One of the pioneering works in dealing with selfish parents and pension systems is 
Leibenstein (1957). According to the “social security hypothesis” formulated in this 
work, the reasons for parents to demand children is that of supporting their old-age 
consumption. In fact, this system would work as a resources transfer mechanism for 
periods in which the agent is unproductive and have to rely on working-age savings, 
perhaps hard to be gathered because of stringent budget constraints, given of absence of 
capital markets. This literature has received many contributions (see Nishimura and 
Zhang, 1992, Wigger, 1999 and Yoon and Talmain, 2001); its predictability power in 
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analysing developing countries actual and expected economic fundamentals (just 
remember that most of these economies strongly rely on the availability of abundant and 
cheap labour force, s.c Demographic Window) made this approach very attractive. The 
most common instrument to introduce such a ruling mechanism in family choices is that 
of assuming a reverse (from children toward parents) of a two-sided (from parents 
toward children and vice versa) altruism. 
However, the same power in explaining fertility choices has been found even in 
case of altruistic parents. According to Cigno (1992), also altruistic parents may take 
advantage of resource transfers from their children without becoming selfish, but this 
should be supported by some forms of social contract that guarantees that the transfer of 
resources will be maintained in subsequent periods. Moreover, this altruistic setting is 
supported in some of its main conclusions. First of all the positive dependence of 
fertility on the interest rate; while the non-altruistic side of the theory states that an 
increase in the interest rate will determine a relative increase of young-age consumption 
(because of an increase in the subjective discount rate of future utilities) and a decrease 
in fertility, the altruistic formulation foresees the opposite. That is due to the positive 
cross-substitution effect and the positive income effect (but this actually depends on the 
specific formulation of the model) generated both on the size and the per-capita 
consumption of offspring. 
 One of the most complete studies on the relation between social security and 
fertility is offered by Cigno and Rosati (1992). In particular, they study the effect of 
existing fully-funded social security systems and their changes in coverage on fertility 
choices and savings according to different motives for parents to reproduce. Hence, the 
first hypothesis is of having selfish individuals that plan their resources allocation by 
maximizing the utility derived by their own consumption among childhood, adulthood 
and seniority, 𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡
2 and 𝑐𝑡
3.27 Moreover, they have full access to capital markets in 
order to secure their old age consumption (for which they do not perceive labour 
income) and give loans to children.28 Hence, denoting by 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑑𝑡 the transfers that an 
                                                 
27  Note that in this model it is introduced a “youth” consumption 𝑐𝑡
1, although there is no income. This 
can be interpreted as the loan in kind that an individual receives from parents 
28  This point is fundamental. When pure selfish motive rules fertility choices, bequests are replaced by 
loans that agents can give to children in order to increase their consumption possibilities. 
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individual receives during adulthood (labour income) and old age (repayment of the 
loan given to children for consumption 𝑐𝑡+1
1 ), the budget constraint can be expressed 
as:29 
 
𝑐𝑡
2 + 𝑑𝑡−1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑡+1
1 = 𝑦𝑡                          (I.113) 
𝑐𝑡
3 = 𝑛𝑡𝑑𝑡                    (I.114) 
 
However, individuals may have an incentive to renege on their debt to parents if there 
were a capital market that allowed him to provide for his own old age by buying assets; 
such a behaviour will lead to the exclusion from family’s transfers. 
On the other side, it may be assumed that parents are altruistic toward children, so that 
their utility function will take into account the fertility rate 𝑛𝑡 and children utility 𝑈𝑡+1: 
 
𝑈𝑡 = 𝑈(𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡
2, 𝑐𝑡
3, 𝑛𝑡 , 𝑈𝑡+1)                 (I.115) 
 
Or, according to Wildasin (1990):30 
 
𝑈1 = 𝑈(𝑐1, 𝑐2, 𝑛)                  (I.116) 
 
Hence, as loans are no more considered, we denote 𝑘2 as the bequest left to children and 
𝜏𝑖 the net transfers from the Government to generation 𝑖 (difference between social 
security contribution and pensions), so that the budget constraint for the two generations 
are: 
 
𝑐1 = 𝑦1 + 𝜏1 −
𝑘2
1+𝑟
                  (I.117) 
𝑐2 = 𝑦2 + 𝜏2 +
𝑘2
𝑛
                  (I.118) 
                                                 
29 Obviously, although consumption during youth is considered and enters the utility function, there is no 
budget constraint for it as it is an object of choice for parents born at time 𝑡 − 1 through transfers. 
30 Fundamental results can be derived in this simplified utility version, where only two generations are 
considered and lifetime periods are reduced to one. 
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Moreover, the Government should keep transfers in balance, so that: 
 
𝜏1 +
𝑛
𝑟
𝜏2 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡                  (I.119) 
 
Saving and fertility equations are then estimated from Italian time series data, using as 
explanatory variables the market rate of interest, the social security deficit, various 
measures of capital market accessibility and social security coverage, and a number of 
income and wage variables. Particularly worthy of note is the result that a fully-funded 
increase in social security coverage raises saving, while an increase in the social 
security deficit has the opposite effect. The empirical findings appear to support the 
assumption that fertility is endogenous and jointly determined with saving, and to 
favour the hypothesis that individual decisions are motivated by self-interest rather than 
intergenerational altruism. 
On the same line of Cigno and Rosati (1992), Zhang and Zhang (1998) studied the 
effect of the introduction of an unfunded social security system when parents have 
different motives for having children. Apart from the non-altruistic case, the author 
analyses two fundamental cases of altruism, a weak and a strong one. In the first 
(altruistic) case, parents care only about the number of children, so that the utility 
function has the same expression as the one by Eckstein and Wolpin (1985): 
 
𝑈 = 𝑉(𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡+1
2 , 𝑛𝑡)                  (I.120) 
 
In the second (selfish) case, parents care not only to their number of children, but even 
to their future of welfare, as in Razin and Ben-Zion (1975), Cigno and Rosati (1992), 
Caballe (1995) and Zhang (1995):31 
 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑈(𝑐𝑡
1, 𝑐𝑡+1
2 , 𝑛𝑡) + 𝛼𝑉𝑡+1                        (I.121) 
0 < 𝛼 < 1  
                                                 
31 Although the utility form is the same, Caballe (1995) did not take fertility as an object of choice for 
parents. 
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Given a child rearing cost 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)
𝜀 with 𝜀 > 1 and a level of savings 𝑠𝑡, the budget 
constraint will be given by: 
 
𝑐𝑡
1 = (1 − 𝛿 − 𝜏1)[1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)
𝜀 ]𝑤 − 𝑠𝑡              (I.122) 
𝑐𝑡+1
2 = (1 + 𝑟)𝑠𝑡 + (1 + 𝑛𝑡)𝛿[1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)
𝜀 ]𝑤 + 𝑇𝑡+1            (I.123) 
 
Where 𝛿 is the share of labour income voluntary given from children to parents and 
𝑇𝑡+1 is the pension transfer: 
 
𝑇𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑛𝑡)𝜏[1 − 𝛽(1 + 𝑛𝑡)
𝜀 ]𝑤               (I.124) 
 
As a result when intergenerational transfers are positive, social security reduces fertility 
but savings may not be affected; it is not surprising that social security increases per 
capita income growth. When intergenerational transfers are zero, social security reduces 
both fertility and savings, so that the effect on income per capita growth cannot be 
determined univocally. However, intergenerational transfers will be affected by the 
labour tax imposed to finance the social security system. In fact, if children are treated 
as pure capital goods (the case of strong altruism), gifts from children to parents must 
be positive no matter how high the social security tax becomes. If children are 
consumption goods as well as capital goods (the case of weak altruism), however, gifts 
may become zero when social security tax is sufficiently high and may even become 
negative if the social security tax increases further. 
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Chapter 2: The Barro-Becker Model (1989) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Barro-Becker (1989) model analyses fertility choices of altruistic individuals 
in a closed economy, so that the wage and interest rate are determined by the level of 
capital accumulated in the system. However, because of the Representative Household 
hypothesis, agents will take these parameters as given for any single period (perfect 
information on their time path) during the maximization problem. The altruism 
hypothesis permits agents to be considered as infinitively lived, though the model 
configures as an OLG in which individuals live for just two periods. The optimization 
process implies a non-arbitrage condition for consumption across generations, while 
fertility decisions are governed by the equality between the marginal benefit of an 
additional child and its rearing cost. As a result consumption growth depends on 
changes in the child-rearing cost, but not on the interest rates or time preference. 
Fertility choices instead depend positively on the World's long-term real interest rate 
and the degree of altruism. 
The Chapter develops as follows. First we will set up the constrained utility 
maximization under a dynastic budget constraint. Second we will consider the effects of 
child mortality on fertility choices and consumption pats across generations. Finally we 
analyse the equilibrium of the model. 
 
 
2.2 The model 
 
In the first paragraph we will set up the individual problem for optimally choosing 
consumption and fertility in any period; this maximization process will be assimilated to 
the choice of an individual born at time 𝑖 = 0 that determines the optimal allocation of 
resources (initial wealth and labour wage) over an infinite time horizon thanks to the 
assumption of altruism toward children. The framework is more general with respect to 
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what presented in Becker and Barro (1988) in the assumption of a closed economy 
where the wage and the interest rate is determined by competitive markets. 
In the second paragraph we will develop some comparative static analyses for 
studying the effect of a change in exogenous variables (like the initial wealth or the cost 
of rising children) on consumption and fertility choices. 
 
 
2.2.1 The maximization process  
 
Assume each individual lives for two periods; in the first period, during childhood, it is 
supported by parents, while in the second one, during adulthood, it supplies labour and 
gives birth to the next generation with no need for marriage. An agent born at time 𝑡 
derives utility 𝑈𝑡 by its own consumption 𝑐𝑡, the number of children 𝑛𝑡 and their utility 
𝑈𝑖,𝑡+1, 𝑖 = 1, _, 𝑛𝑡. Assuming additivity and separability of the utility function, we could 
give the following general specification: 
 
𝑈0 = 𝑣(𝑐0, 𝑛0) + ∑ 𝜓(𝑈𝑖,1, 𝑛0)
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1                   (II.1) 
 
Where 𝑣(𝑐0, 𝑛0) is the standard instant utility (𝑣𝑐 > 0 and 𝑣𝑖𝑖 < 0, 𝑖 = 𝑐0, 𝑛0) and 𝜓 >
0 is the altruistic function.32 Since children concur equally to the maximization of 
parent’s utility, we can state that the optimal choice will confer the same utility level to 
all siblings if the function 𝜓(𝑈𝑖,1, 𝑛0) is increasing and concave, so that (II.1) can be 
rewritten as: 
 
𝑈0 = 𝑣(𝑐0, 𝑛0) + 𝑛0𝜓(𝑈𝑖,1, 𝑛0)                   (II.2) 
 
Assuming that 𝑈1 depends linearly on 𝑈0, we could reformulate (II.2) as: 
 
𝑈0 = 𝑣(𝑐0, 𝑛0) + 𝑎(𝑛0)𝑛0𝑈1           (II.3) 
                                                 
32  Note that the absence of subscripts to the altruistic function 𝜓 lays on the assumption of equal value of 
siblings for parent’s utility. 
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Where the term 𝑎(𝑛0) measures the degree of altruism. The usual assumption is that for 
any given level of children utility 𝑈1, the function 𝑈0 in (II.3) is increasing and concave, 
i.e.:33  
 
𝑣𝑛 + 𝑎(𝑛0) + 𝑛0𝑎
′(𝑛0) > 0,   𝑣𝑛𝑛 + 2𝑎
′(𝑛0) + 𝑛0𝑎
′′(𝑛0) < 0       (II.4) 
 
As utility form is assumed to be identical for all cohorts, we can express the dynastic 
utility function as: 
 
𝑈0 = ∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑣(𝑐𝑖, 𝑛𝑖)
∞
𝑖=0            (II.5) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑖 is the implied degree of altruism of the dynastic head toward each descendant 
in the ith generation and 𝑁𝑖 is the number of descendants in the ith generation: 
 
𝐴0 = 1    𝐴𝑖 = ∏ 𝑎(𝑛𝑖),   𝑖 = 1,2, …
𝑖−1
𝑗=0            (II.6) 
𝑁0 = 1    𝑁𝑗 = ∏ 𝑛𝑗
𝑖−1
𝑗=0 ,   𝑖 = 1,2, …          (II.7) 
 
A parent is "selfish" if the marginal utility of own consumption exceeds the marginal 
utility derived from his child's consumption when the parent has one child (𝑛 =  1). 
This definition implies that 𝑎(1) < 1 for selfish parents. We assume that parents are 
"selfish" because the utility of a dynastic family with stationary consumption per person 
(𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐) and a stationary number of descendants (𝑁𝑖 = 1) would be bounded only if 
𝑎(1) < 1. 
During adulthood, agents supply a unit of labour and receive a wage 𝑤𝑖; they 
leave a non-depreciable bequest 𝑘𝑖+1 to any children 𝑛𝑖 at the beginning of child’s 
adulthood. Capital 𝑘𝑖 earns a rent 𝑟𝑖. Assuming that the total cost of rising children is 𝛽𝑖, 
the intertemporal budget constraint is given by: 
 
                                                 
33  Note that, with this specification, children could even provide disutility for a non-altruistic agent. 
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𝑤𝑖 + (1 + 𝑟𝑖)𝑘𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖(𝛽𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖+1)          (II.8) 
 
Note that the cost of rising children 𝛽𝑖 is independent on children quality, which in turn 
is measured by their consumption 𝑐𝑖+1, wage 𝑤𝑖+1 and inheritance 𝑘𝑖+1; moreover, no 
restrictions are put on 𝑘𝑖, so that debt can be left to children, provided that the present 
value of debts is zero.34 The maximization of (II.5) subject to (II.8) leads to a chosen 
path for 𝑐𝑖,  𝑘𝑖+1 and 𝑁𝑖+1 assuming the path for 𝑤𝑖, 𝑟𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 as given. 
 A useful simplification of the problem is introduced by the assumption that 
fertility does not affect current period utility 𝑣, and this can be done by assuming a 
constant elasticity of the degree of altruism with respect to the number of children, i.e.: 
 
𝑎(𝑛𝑖) = 𝛼(𝑛𝑖)
−𝜀            (II.9) 
 
in this case the degree of altruism toward descendants in (II.6) depends only on the 
number of descendants in generation i, 𝑁𝑖, specifically 𝐴𝑖 = 𝛼
𝑖(𝑁𝑖)
−𝜀. The condition 
0 < 𝑎(1) < 1 translates into the new one 0 < 𝛼 < 1, while the increase and concavity 
assumption on (II.5) brings to 0 < 𝜀 < 1. Given (II.9), the dynastic utility function in 
(II.5) is reformulated as: 
 
𝑈0 = ∑ 𝛼
𝑖(𝑁𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑣(𝑐𝑖)
∞
𝑖=0                   (II.10) 
 
Given a constant level of aggregate consumption 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖𝑐𝑖, parents will have the 
incentive of giving birth to an additional child only in case the derivative of (II.10) with 
respect to 𝑁𝑖 (holding constant 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑐𝑗) is positive, i.e.: 
 
𝜕𝑈0
𝜕𝑁𝑖
= 𝛼(1 − 𝜀)(𝑁𝑖)
−𝜀𝑣 (
𝐶𝑖
𝑁𝑖
) + 𝛼(𝑁𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑣′ (
𝐶𝑖
𝑁𝑖
) (
𝐶𝑖
(𝑁𝑖)
2) > 0  
= 𝛼(𝑁𝑖)
−𝜀 [𝑣 (
𝐶𝑖
𝑁𝑖
) (1 − 𝜀) + 𝑣′ (
𝐶𝑖
𝑁𝑖
) (
𝐶𝑖
𝑁𝑖
)] > 0  
 
                                                 
34  This assumption is fundamental to avoid the emergence of Ponzi Games, so that the value of debt 
increases faster than the interest rate as parents always leave a negative bequest 𝑘𝑖 to offspring. 
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as 𝛼(𝑁𝑖)
−𝜀 > 0, the condition we need is: 
 
𝜎(𝑐𝑖) < 1 − 𝜀                    (II.11) 
 
Where 𝜎(𝑐𝑖) = 𝑣′(𝑐𝑖)𝑐𝑖 𝑣(𝑐𝑖)⁄ . 
 The maximization of (II.10) subject to (II.8) leads to the following Lagrangian 
function: 
 
ℒ(𝑐𝑖, 𝑁𝑖+1, 𝑘𝑖+1, 𝜆𝑖) = ∑ 𝛼
𝑖(𝑁𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑣(𝑐𝑖)
∞
𝑖=0 − 𝜆𝑖[𝑤𝑖 + (1 + 𝑟𝑖)𝑘𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑛𝑖(𝛽𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖+1)]  
 
the first set of FOCs can be taken by: 
 
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖(𝑁𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑣′(𝑐𝑖) + 𝜆𝑖 = 0  
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖+1
= 𝛼𝑖+1(𝑁𝑖+1)
1−𝜀𝑣′(𝑐𝑖+1) + 𝜆𝑖+1 = 0  
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑘𝑖+1
= 𝜆𝑖𝑛𝑖 − 𝜆𝑖+1(1 + 𝑟𝑖+1) = 0  
 
from the last equation: 
  
𝜆𝑖
𝜆𝑖+1
=
(1+𝑟𝑖+1)
𝑛𝑖
  
 
while from the first two: 
  
𝑣′(𝑐𝑖)
𝛼(𝑛𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑣′(𝑐𝑖+1)
=
𝜆𝑖
𝜆𝑖+1
=
(1+𝑟𝑖+1)
𝑛𝑖
  
 
So that the first set of FOCs is given by: 
 
𝑣′(𝑐𝑖)
𝑣′(𝑐𝑖+1)
= 𝛼(1 + 𝑟𝑖+1)(𝑛𝑖)
−𝜀                  (II.12) 
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the second set of FOCs is easily derived by an alternative formulation of our Lagrangian 
equation: 
 
ℒ(𝑐𝑖, 𝑁𝑖+1, 𝑘𝑖+1, 𝜆𝑖) = ∑ 𝛼
𝑖(𝑁𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑣(𝑐𝑖)
∞
𝑖=0 − 𝜆𝑖[𝑘0 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑤𝑖
∞
𝑖=0 − ∑ 𝑑𝑖(𝑁𝑖𝑐𝑖+𝑁𝑖+1𝛽𝑖)
∞
𝑖=0 ]  
  
Where 𝑑𝑖 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑗)
−1𝑖
𝑗=0 . Partial derivatives with respect to consumption and 
fertility are: 
  
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖(𝑁𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑣′(𝑐𝑖) + 𝜆𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑁𝑖 = 0  
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑁𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝜀)(𝑁𝑖)
−𝜀𝑣(𝑐𝑖) + 𝜆𝑖𝑑𝑖[𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡)] = 0  
 
so that by substituting for the expression for 𝜆𝑖𝑑𝑖: 
 
(1 − 𝜀)𝑣(𝑐𝑖) = 𝑣
′(𝑐𝑖)[𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡)]  
 
recalling the expression for 𝜎(𝑐𝑖): 
 
𝑣(𝑐𝑖)[1 − 𝜀 − 𝜎(𝑐𝑖)] = 𝑣
′(𝑐𝑖)[𝛽𝑖−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡) − 𝑤𝑖]              (II.13) 
 
finally we can derive the dynastic budget constraint by simply: 
 
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝜆𝑖
= 𝑘0 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑁𝑖𝑤𝑖
∞
𝑖=0 − ∑ 𝑑𝑖(𝑁𝑖𝑐𝑖+𝑁𝑖+1𝛽𝑖) = 0
∞
𝑖=0              (II.14) 
 
Note that (II.12) is an arbitrage condition for shifting consumption from one generation 
to the next; in particular the utility rate of substitution, 
𝑣′(𝑐𝑖)
𝑣′(𝑐𝑖+1)
, depends directly on the 
interest rate and the time-preference factor 𝛼, while it is negatively affected by the 
number of children at time i.35 
                                                 
35 The interpretation for this relationship is that, given the altruism coefficient 𝛼, an increase in 𝑛𝑖 
decreases the altruism factor 𝛼𝑖(𝑁𝑖)
1−𝜀, enhancing the discount rate of future consumption. 
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Equation (II.13) equates the marginal benefit of an additional child to the marginal 
cost, while holding fixed the total consumption 𝐶𝑖 of that generation. As discussed 
earlier, this marginal utility must be positive near an optimal position, which implies 
that 1 − 𝜀 − 𝜎(𝑐𝑖)  >  0 by equation (II.11). The same condition is found by SOCs for 
maximization. Just computing the Hessian Matrix of the Lagrangian: 
 
(
 
 
𝜕2ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖
2
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖𝜕𝑁𝑖
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖𝜕𝜆𝑖
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑁𝑖𝜕𝑐𝑖
𝜕2ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑁𝑖
2
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑁𝑖𝜕𝜆𝑖
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝜆𝑖𝜕𝑐𝑖
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝜆𝑖𝜕𝑁𝑖
𝜕2ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝜆𝑖
2 )
 
 
  
 
Where: 
 
𝜕2ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖
2 = 𝛼
𝑖(𝑁𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑣′′(𝑐𝑖) < 0  
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖𝜕𝑁𝑖
=
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑁𝑖𝜕𝑐𝑖
= 𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝜀)(𝑁𝑖)
−𝜀𝑣′(𝑐𝑖) − 𝜆𝑖𝑑𝑖 = 0  
𝜕2ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑁𝑖
2 = 𝛼
𝑖(1 − 𝜀)(−𝜀)(𝑁𝑖)
−𝜀−1𝑣(𝑐𝑖) < 0  
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖𝜕𝜆𝑖
=
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝜆𝑖𝜕𝑐𝑖
= −𝑑𝑖𝑁𝑖 < 0  
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝜆𝑖𝜕𝑁𝑖
=
𝜕ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑁𝑖𝜕𝜆𝑖
= 𝑑𝑖[𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡)]  
𝜕2ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝜆𝑖
2 = 0  
 
The signs are associated according to assumptions on equation (II.10) and the FOCs in 
(II.12) and (II.13). Hence, in order to find a maximum in the optimization process, we 
need the Lagrangian function to be concave. The condition on pure derivatives is 
satisfied, as 
𝜕2ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑐𝑖
2 , 
𝜕2ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝑁𝑖
2 , 
𝜕2ℒ(∙)
𝜕𝜆𝑖
2  are all non-positive; however, the condition for the 
definition of the Hessian Matrix is needed, so that: 
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[𝛼𝑖(1 − 𝜀)𝜀(𝑁𝑖)
−𝜀−1𝑣(𝑐𝑖)][𝑑𝑖𝑁𝑖]
2 + {𝑑𝑖[𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡)]}
2𝛼𝑖(𝑁𝑖)
1−𝜀𝑣′′(𝑐𝑖) < 0  
 
After few algebraic passages: 
 
(1 − 𝜀)𝜀𝑣(𝑐𝑖) + [𝑤𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡)]
2𝑣′′(𝑐𝑖) < 0  
 
Just applying the expression for the second member from partial derivative with respect 
to fertility: 
 
𝜀 +
𝑣(𝑐𝑖)(1−𝜀)
[𝑣′(𝑐𝑖)]
2 𝑣
′′(𝑐𝑖) < 0  
 
If we assume a CES form for 𝑣(𝑐𝑖), i.e.  𝑣(𝑐𝑖) = (𝑐𝑖)
𝜎 𝜎⁄ , then we will have: 
 
𝜀 + 𝜎 − 1 < 0  
 
Which coincides with equation (II.9). 
In particular, condition (II.11) appears to imply that consumption is positive only when 
children are a financial burden, that is when the cost of rearing a child exceeds the 
present value of his lifetime earnings.  
Just applying the definition of 𝜎(𝑐𝑖) to (II.13): 
 
𝑐𝑖[1 − 𝜀 − 𝜎(𝑐𝑖)] 𝜎(𝑐𝑖)⁄ = 𝛽𝑖−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡) − 𝑤𝑖               (II.15) 
 
The optimal solution for the fertility rate 𝑛𝑖 can be found simply by substituting (II.15) 
into (II.12) and rearranging: 
 
𝑛𝑖 = [𝛼(1 + 𝑟𝑖+1)
𝑣′(𝑐𝑖+1)
𝑣′(𝑐𝑖)
]
1
𝜀
= [𝛼(1 + 𝑟𝑖+1)
𝛽𝑖−1(1+𝑟𝑡)−𝑤𝑖
𝛽𝑖(1+𝑟𝑡+1)−𝑤𝑖+1
]
1
𝜀
            (II.16) 
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2.2.2 The Production side 
 
In an open economy, where the interest rate is given exogenously by the rest of the 
world, a country's aggregate holding of assets, 𝐾𝑖, could differ from its stock of 
productive capital. Instead, we assume a closed economy where the holding of assets 
equals the stock of productive capital and, as in standard growth models of a closed 
economy, interest rates and wage rates, 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑤𝑖. 
We specify that production takes place in "firms" via a standard one-sector production 
function that exhibits constant returns to scale and Harrod-neutral technical progress.36 
Hence: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐹[𝐾𝑖, (1 + 𝑔)
𝑖𝐿𝑖]                   (II.17) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖 is the total level of output, 𝐾𝑖 is the level of physical capital in the economy, 
𝐿𝑖 is the labour force and g represents the exogenous technological progress. Letting 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖 (1 + 𝑔)
𝑖𝐿𝑖⁄  and ?̂?𝑖 = 𝐾𝑖 (1 + 𝑔)
𝑖𝐿𝑖⁄ , (II.17) can be rewritten as: 
 
?̂?𝑖 = 𝑓(?̂?𝑖)                    (II.18) 
𝑓′ > 0 , 𝑓′′ < 0  
 
Assuming competitive markets and profit maximization, factors will be paid according 
to their production shares, so that: 
 
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑓
′(?̂?𝑖)                                  (II.19) 
𝑤𝑖 = [𝑓(?̂?𝑖) − ?̂?𝑖𝑓
′(?̂?𝑖)](1 + 𝑔)
𝑖                 (II.20) 
 
On the side of households, it is assumed that each child requires both time and material 
goods in order to be reared. In this sense, its bearing cost can be represented in the 
following form: 
                                                 
36 This assumption is necessary in order to deal with steady states where control variables grow at a 
constant rate. 
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𝛽𝑖 = 𝑎(1 + 𝑔)
𝑖 + 𝑏𝑤𝑖                   (II.21) 
𝑎 ≥ 0 , 0 ≤ 𝑏 < 1  
 
 
2.2 Comparative statics 
 
Assuming that 𝜎(𝑐𝑖) grows less than 𝑐𝑖, we could say that the left hand side of (II.15) is 
increasing in 𝑐𝑖, so that 𝑐𝑖 is a positive function of the net cost of producing another 
descendant in generation i; in other words, consumption per person, 𝑐𝑖, would rise 
across generations only if the net cost of creating descendants also rose. This constitutes 
a fundamental difference with usual conditions in optimal consumption models.37 This 
result derives from the fact that, this in specification, the rate of growth across 
generations of consumption per person is essentially independent on the level of interest 
rates, and also does not depend on pure altruism or time preference. 
Regarding fertility rate, 𝑛𝑖, we could say that, according to equation (II.16), it rises with 
the altruism coefficient 𝛼 and the interest rate 𝑟𝑖+1; while the first dependence, the one 
on 𝛼 is expectable, the other is not as straightforward. This result is derived from the 
consideration that there is an effect implied by the interest rate that tends to increase 
consumption over time and this effect dominates the increase in the cost for capital in 
the steady state. 
Another important property of the model concerns the effects of changes in 
wealth, which we represent by shifts in the initial asset level 𝑘0. Equation (II.15) 
implies that future consumption per person, 𝑐𝑖, is unaffected if a shift in wealth does not 
change the net cost of raising children. Then equation (II.16) implies that future fertility 
𝑛𝑖+1, for 𝑖 =  1,2, . .., also does not change. With future consumption per capita and 
future fertility unchanged, the dynastic budget equation (II.14) requires either initial 
consumption 𝑐0 or fertility 𝑛0 to change. Using equation (II.16) for 𝑖 = 0, we can see 
                                                 
37 The most common condition for consumption growth over time is that the rate of time preference, in 
our case the altruism factor, is lower than the real interest rate. 
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that an increase (or decrease) in 𝑐0 must be accompanied by an increase (or decrease) in 
𝑛0.  
These results imply that an increase in inherited wealth increases only the scale of a 
dynastic family. The number of descendants, 𝑁𝑖, and aggregate consumption 𝐶𝑖 in each 
future generation would increase only because of the increase in initial fertility 𝑛0. To 
see the effect on 𝑁𝑖 directly, the substitution for each fertility rate from equation (II.16) 
leads to: 
 
𝑁𝑖 = [𝛼
𝑖 𝑣
′(𝑐𝑖)
𝑣′(𝑐0)
∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑗)
𝑖
𝑗−1 ]
1
𝜀
  𝑖 = 1,2, …               (II.22) 
 
so that an increase in 𝑐0 determines an increase in 𝑁𝑖 as all future values of consumption 
will be unchanged. 
 A somewhat surprising result is that future capital per person, 𝑘𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, . .., is 
not affected by a change in wealth. This result follows from the dynastic budget 
constraint in equation (II.14) because future consumption per person, 𝑐𝑖, and fertility, 𝑛𝑖, 
are unchanged. Put differently, bequests to each child are unaffected by a change in 
parent's wealth. 
 The model also has surprising implications about the effects of temporary changes 
in the cost of producing children 𝛽 at time i on fertility, compensated by a subsidy on 
wealth 𝑘0, so that the marginal utility 𝑣′(𝑐𝑖) remains unchanged. While (II.15) indicates 
that 𝑐𝑖 rises and consumption in other periods do not change, equation (II.16) implies 
that 𝑛𝑖 falls; however 𝑛𝑖+1 rises exactly in the same proportion to offset the fall in 𝑛𝑖. 
The reason is that dynastic utility in equation (II.10) is a time-separable function of the 
number of descendants and consumption in each generation. Dynastic utility does not 
depend explicitly on the fertility of any generation.38 
 Consider now a compensated, permanent increase in the cost of children that 
raises the net cost of children, 𝛽𝑖 (1 + 𝑟𝑖+1) − 𝑤𝑖+1, by the same proportion for each 
                                                 
38 Time-separable utility functions imply that the demand for a variable at time i depends only on the 
marginal utility of wealth and the prices of variables at time i. Consequently, for a given marginal 
utility of wealth, the number of descendants and consumption in generation 𝑖 would not be affected by 
price changes in other generations. 
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generation 𝑖 ≥ 𝑗. According to (II.16), we know that consumption in any generation 𝑖 ≥
𝑗, 𝑐𝑖, will increase, and this shift will be equiproportional if we assume that the elasticity 
of 𝑣(𝑐𝑖) with respect to 𝑐𝑖 is constant and equal to 𝜎; hence (II.12) simplifies in the 
following form:39 
 
(
𝑐𝑖+1
𝑐𝑖
)
1−𝜎
= 𝛼(1 + 𝑟𝑖+1)(𝑛𝑖)
−𝜀                 (II.23) 
 
So that fertility in 𝑗, 𝑛𝑗 , falls as 
𝑐𝑗+1
𝑐𝑗
 rises, but it will remain unchanged for all 
subsequent periods 𝑖 > 𝑗; though this is only a temporary effect on the relevant decision 
variable, fertility, this will affect also subsequent generations as the number of 
descendants will be inevitably lower. Moreover, higher values of capital endowment per 
person, 𝑘𝑖, are needed in order to support higher levels of consumption in all periods 
𝑖 > 𝑗. 
 Another important issue to consider is the effect of child mortality. To tackle this 
topic, just assume that wage rates and interest rates are stationary over time, and that 
parents ignore the uncertainty about child deaths and respond only to changes in the 
fraction 𝑝 of offspring that survive childhood. Let 𝛽𝑠 be the constant marginal cost of 
rearing a child to adulthood, and 𝛽𝑚 be the cost of a child that dies prior to becoming an 
adult. The expected cost of 𝑛𝑏 births is given by 𝑝𝛽𝑠  + (1 − 𝑝) 𝛽𝑚. The ratio of this 
expected cost to the expected number of survivors (𝑛 = 𝑝𝑛𝑏) which corresponds to our 
previous cost per (surviving) child is: 
 
𝛽 = 𝛽𝑠 + 𝛽𝑚 (1 − 𝑝) 𝑝⁄                   (II.24) 
 
A permanent decline in the level of child mortality lowers the cost of raising surviving 
children in all generations. Our prior analysis implies that the demand for surviving 
children per adult (𝑛𝑖) rises in the initial generation, but that it is no higher in later 
generations. Since the demand for surviving children increases in the initial generation, 
                                                 
39  Assuming that the elasticity of 𝑣(𝑐𝑖) with respect to 𝑐𝑖 is constant and equal to 𝜎 is equivalent to 
assume that the function 𝑣(𝑐𝑖) = (𝑐𝑖)
𝜎 𝜎⁄ . 
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birth rates may also rise then, although the higher probability of survival, 𝑝, reduces the 
number of births, 𝑛𝑏, needed to produce a given number of survivors. Birth rates 
definitely fall in later generations because the demand for surviving children in these 
generations would not be affected by the increase in 𝑝. 
If child mortality continues to fall over time, the cost of rearing surviving children 
would continue to fall over time, and hence the demand for surviving children per adult 
would increase for more than one generation. However, the rate of decline in child 
mortality must slow down once it approaches zero, as it has in the West during the past 
forty years. As the rate of decline slows, the rate of decline in the cost of producing 
survivors also slows and eventually more or less ceases. Thereafter, the cumulative 
increase in the child survival probability does not affect the demand for surviving 
children. 
 The model is not set up to incorporate social security precisely because we have 
only one period of adulthood; as previous Chapter shows, at least three periods 
(childhood, adulthood and seniority) are necessary for considering fertility choices and 
social security systems. Therefore, a pay as- you-go system of taxes on young working 
adults cannot finance payments to old adults. However, similar results can be obtained if 
we imagine (unrealistically) that a tax is levied on children to finance transfers to adults. 
This assumption can be compared to the standard hypothesis for social security (that a 
tax is imposed on working age wage to collect resources to be redistributed to retired 
individuals) to the extent of anticipating the contribution of the young cohort in favour 
of the old. However, this setting would make the child birth giving and the advantages 
from the social security system (transfers to adults) concide. Let 𝑠𝑖 be the transfer 
received by the representative adult in generation i, and 𝜏𝑖+1 be the tax paid during 
generation i by each child (or by parents on behalf of their children). The government's 
budget is balanced if 𝑠𝑖𝑁𝑖 = 𝜏𝑖+1𝑁𝑖, which implies that: 
 
𝜏𝑖+1 = 𝑠𝑖 𝑛𝑖⁄                    (II.25)  
  
For given values of fertility, the benefits from social security and the taxes to finance 
them have exactly offsetting effects on the dynastic wealth of the representative family. 
Therefore, if fertility were unchanged, a change in the scale of the social security 
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program would not affect intergenerational patterns of consumption. Parents would raise 
their bequests sufficiently so that their children can pay these taxes without cutting back 
on their consumption (see Barro [1974]). 
However, the endogeneity of fertility modifies the so-called "Ricardian Equivalence 
Theorem." The social security program imposes the lifetime cost per child of: 
 
𝑠𝑖
𝑛𝑖
−
𝑠𝑖+1
1+𝑟𝑖+1
                     (II.26) 
 
Given a flat subsidy system, that is 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠 = 𝑠𝑖+1, the net tax is positive if 1 + 𝑟𝑖+1 >
𝑛𝑖. With a positive net tax, an increase in the scale of the social security program (an 
increase in s) raises the cost of children; the same substitution effect as an increase in 
the cost of raising a child, 𝛽. Therefore, our previous analysis of the effects of changes 
in the cost of children applies to social security. Therefore, a permanent increase in 
social security benefits tends to reduce fertility temporarily even when children do not 
support their elderly parents. 
The same holds for the impact on consumption; the positive effect of higher social 
security benefits on the cost of rearing children would raise ''capital intensity". 
 
 
2.3 The Equilibrium 
 
The time allocated to work 𝐿𝑖 depends on the number of adults in the cohort 𝑁𝑖 and the 
time allocated to rising children 𝑏; in particular, parents should devote 𝑏𝑛𝑖 units of time 
for child rearing, so that the labour supply curve is defined by: 
 
𝐿𝑖 = (1 − 𝑏𝑛𝑖)𝑁𝑖  
 
So that dividing equations by (1 − 𝑏𝑛𝑖) permits to express variables in terms of labour 
input units. After doing so to the intertemporal budget constraint in (II.5), and 
expressing in efficiency units (so that dividing by (1 + 𝑔)𝑖), we get: 
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?̂?𝑖 + (1 − 𝑏𝑛𝑖)(1 + 𝑟𝑖)?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖[?̂?𝑖 + (1 + 𝑔)(1 − 𝑏𝑛𝑖+1)?̂?𝑖+1]           (II.27) 
 
Where ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 (1 + 𝑔)
𝑖 = [𝑓(?̂?𝑖) − ?̂?𝑖𝑓
′(?̂?𝑖)]⁄  , ?̂?𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 (1 + 𝑔)
𝑖⁄ = 𝑎 + 𝑏?̂?𝑖 = 𝑎 +
𝑏[𝑓(?̂?𝑖) − ?̂?𝑖𝑓
′(?̂?𝑖)] and ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 (1 + 𝑔)
𝑖⁄ . By dividing equation (II.15) by (1 + 𝑔)𝑖, 
we can get: 
 
?̂?𝑖 = (
𝜎
1−𝜀−𝜎
) [?̂?𝑖−1 (
1+𝑟𝑖
1+𝑔
) − ?̂?𝑖]                (II.28)  
 
By substituting (II.28) into (II.27) we can get the fundamental function for analysing the 
dynamics of physical capital per efficient worker accumulation: 
 
 
?̂?𝑖 + (1 − 𝑏𝑛𝑖)(1 + 𝑟𝑖)?̂?𝑖 =  
(
𝜎
1−𝜀−𝜎
) [?̂?𝑖−1 (
1+𝑟𝑖
1+𝑔
) − 𝑤𝑖] + 𝑛𝑖[?̂?𝑖 + (1 + 𝑔)(1 − 𝑏𝑛𝑖+1)?̂?𝑖+1]            (II.29) 
 
And finally, by substituting (II.27) into (II.16), we can get: 
 
𝑛𝑖 = {𝛼(1 + 𝑟𝑖+1) [
1
(1+𝑔)
?̂?𝑖−1(1+𝑟𝑡)−(1+𝑔)?̂?𝑖
?̂?𝑖(1+𝑟𝑡+1)−(1+𝑔)?̂?𝑖+1
]
(1−𝜎)
}
1
𝜀
             (II.30) 
 
In the steady state ?̂?𝑖 does not change; as a consequence, even 𝑛𝑖 , ?̂?𝑖, 𝑟𝑖, ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 are 
constant in equilibrium, so that from (II.27), (II.28), (II.29) and (II.30) we can get: 
 
?̂? + (1 + 𝑟)?̂? = 𝑓(?̂?) + ?̂? = ?̂? + 𝑛[?̂? + (1 + 𝑔)?̂?] + 𝑏𝑛?̂?[1 + 𝑟 − 𝑛(1 + 𝑔)]               (II.31) 
?̂?𝑖 = (
𝜎
1−𝜀−𝜎
) [?̂? (
1+𝑟
1+𝑔
) − ?̂?]                  (II.32) 
𝑓(?̂?) + ?̂? = (
𝜎
1−𝜀−𝜎
) [?̂? (
1+𝑟
1+𝑔
) − ?̂?] + 𝑛[?̂? + (1 + 𝑔)?̂?] + 𝑏𝑛?̂?[1 + 𝑟 − 𝑛(1 + 𝑔)]        (II.33) 
𝑛 = [
 𝛼(1+𝑟)
(1+𝑔)(1−𝜎)
]
1
𝜀
                    (II.34) 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
 
The second Chapter develops the Barro-Becker (1989) model as an example of 
intergenerational model with altruism. In this framework, agents live for two periods, 
but the altruism toward children permits to consider the possibility of infinitively lived 
agents maximizing instantaneous utilities according to a discount factor. A peculiarity of 
the model is the concept of pure altruism, by which agents are interested to descendants’ 
utilities and not other measures (for instance child quantity). This altruism function is 
assumed to be a decreasing function of fertility itself, but still utility is increasing and 
concave in offspring number; the same happens for consumption. A fundamental and 
very strong assumption made in the model is the additivity and separability of utility, 
which stands for time consistency of choices. Though this assumption could result fuzzy 
in an intergenerational model (the idea that generations will be motivated always and 
only by altruism, without deviations from a sort of “social contract”) it is a logic 
consequence of homogeneity assumptions. If generations are all equal among 
themselves, and differ only because of cohort size, this fundamental condition is surely 
justified. Moreover, the production side is assumed to replicate the Solowian 
framework. Conclusions that are drawn from this framework are, to some extents, in 
line with what proposed by approaches studied in the first Chapter of this work. 
Consumption is a positive function of the net cost of producing another descendant in 
the same generation. This result derives from the fact that, this in specification, the rate 
of growth across generations of consumption per person is essentially independent of 
the level of interest rates, and also does not depend on pure altruism or time preference. 
On the other side, fertility rises with parental altruism coefficient and the interest rate 
(same conclusion as in the case of an economy with social securities). This result is 
derived from the consideration that there is an effect implied by the interest rate that 
tends to increase consumption over time and this effect dominates the increase in the 
cost for capital in the steady state. A rise in the initial level of wealth will only have an 
effect in the short run, with an increase in both consumption and fertility, but it will 
disappear in the long run. Given that wealth is a component of income per capita (as it 
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can be reinvested in capital accumulation and labour force through fertility), this hump 
shaped behavior of fertility can be interpreted as the model answer to demographic 
transition. The introduction of child mortality will decrease (surviving) child rearing 
cost and so that demand for children; this result is in line with previous literature. 
However, other results seem to give an answer to some of previous contradicting 
conclusions. For instance, the introduction of a social security system will activate a 
substitution mechanism that will tend to reduce fertility in the long run, and this in line 
with Prinz (1990) and Zhang (1995); this condition will hold depending on the interest 
rate and fertility. However, the opposite condition will be triggered if the condition on 
parameters does not hold, and this validates Cigno and Rosati (1992). Parents would not 
change consumption patterns (as dynastic wealth has not changed) and will generate 
less children because of an increase in the cost of rising them (consequence of the 
Ricardian Equivalence). 
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Chapter 3: An Empirical Insight 
 
 
The last Chapter of this Thesis is devoted to the study of the empirical relationship 
between income growth and fertility choices. Income is the main source of structural 
change in a society: greater economic capabilities tend to increase human capital 
investment (better or more education), decrease child mortality and shift social security 
systems from a “children supporting parents” setting to a modern pension system. In 
simple terms, it boosts all those mechanisms described in the first Chapter (the quality-
quantity tradeoff, the child and infant mortality issue and the old age security 
hypothesis) apt at recreating the so called demographic transition.  
In fact, many authors challenged this empirical trend. Among the earliest works 
Coale and Hoover (1958), suggested that high fertility hampers large real per capita 
income growth; this conclusion supports the so called “Neo-Malthusian” theory.  One of 
the most common hypotheses for this phenomenon lies on technological arguments. The 
reason is that technical progress being non-rival, the cost of inventing new technologies 
is independent of the number of individuals who use it: there is a scale effect. That is, 
for a constant share of resources allocated to the development of new technologies, a 
larger population stimulates the rate of technological progress, so the rate of income 
growth (see Kremer, 1993). This conclusion is generally shared by semi-endogenous 
growth models built on economies characterized by an R&D sector (Jones, 1995; 
Kortum, 1997; Segerstrom, 1998). 
 However, some other works did not support this positive correlation between 
income per capita and fertility (see McNicol, 1984). The ensuing literature can be 
roughly divided into two strands. One approaches the issue from a theoretical point of 
view and finds that, interpreted or with the appropriate additions in choice variables, 
fertility should be negatively related to income. The basic idea is that the price of 
children is largely time, and because of this, children are more expensive for parents 
with higher wages. Another argument is that higher-wage people have a higher demand 
for child quality, making quantity more costly, and hence those parents want fewer 
children. The other strand of literature approaches the issue from an empirical point of 
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view, arguing that the negative relationship is mainly a statistical fluke due to a missing 
variables problem. This literature focuses on identifying those crucial missing variables, 
such as female earnings potential. Once those missing variables are controlled for, 
fertility and income are actually positively related (ee Hotz, Klerman, and Willis, 
1993).40 No doubt, this hypothesis has received a much larger support than the “Neo-
Malthusian” one (among all Jones and Tertilt, 2008). 
The difficulties in extending and generalizing experiments on single country or 
group of countries to Continents or to the World led the scientific community to begin to 
give an ambivalent answer to the question of the relation between GDP and population 
measures (see Kelley, 1988).41 Among all, Andersson, Kreyenfeld and Mika (2009) 
showed how, even controlling for female earnings, the relationship between income and 
fertility may turn up to be uncertain. Though Denmark and West Germany may seem to 
be similar countries in terms of economic fundamentals and traditions, they manage to 
find an opposite impact on fertility because of changes in women wages. 
With the precise aim of giving an answer to this puzzle, we will dedicate the rest of 
this work to data analysis. The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. The first 
paragraph gives a complete framework of what has characterized very long run trends in 
population and income from the nineteenth Century to nowadays. A selection of 12 
countries from 4 Continents will constitute a sample for examining the relation between 
income and population on different stages of economic development. The second 
Paragraph will concentrate on a complete Regional (Continental) analysis on the 
population-income relation; this experiment will be particularly useful to understand the 
demographic transition timing among different Geographical and Economic Regions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
40  However, the negative effect of female wages can be mitigated or even reversed by the link between 
parental benefits and previous earnings. It is reasonable to expect that the system encourages women 
to find a job before having a child even if they are planning to stay at home for a relatively long time 
(Hoem, 2000). 
41 Some authors (Simon, 1989) ended up arguing that the failure in proving a negative effect of population 
growth on income per capita may be interpreted as the absence of this relation. 
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3.1 A Global Analysis 
 
As already mentioned, this Paragraph will intensively tackle the empirical issue of the 
relation between income and fertility choice. The focus of our analysis will comprehend 
two entire Centuries (from 1870 to 2008) for 12 countries; this choice is aimed at 
weighing the sample in order to be fairly representative of what the World has 
experienced in the last decades. For a complete list of selected countries, see Appendix 
A. Unfortunately, the inclusion of African countries inside the sample would create 
serious representation difficulties. The availability of data for this Region is so low that 
no long run interesting analysis can be made with all Continents. The inclusion of 
Africa in this Global Study will certainly delate income phenomena and the 
demographic transition of what we call “The World”.42 We will both concentrate on 
what our international sample has experienced in this very long (run) period and the 
dynamics in single Continents. Though this can’t be considered a complete 
representation of all geographical Areas, we will call it the World for simplicity sake.  
The aim of this study is to understand whether and when the demographic 
transition has produced its effects on population dynamics at an international level. 
Demographers study this phenomenon on a different side (see for instance Bongaarts, 
2010), in general through the behaviour between fertility rates (i.e. crude birth rate) and 
mortality. During the transition, first mortality declines and then fertility follows, 
causing population growth rates first to accelerate and then to slow again, moving 
toward low fertility, long life and an old population. However, in economics, it is much 
more common and useful to understand how population growth depend on measures of 
income (see Jones and Tertilt, 2006; Galor, 2012). In this sense, we adopt general 
income measures (Total GDP and GDP per capita) and demographic indexes (as total 
population or population growth rate). 
In order to understand the long run trend in demographic and economic structures, 
it is useful to investigate data on income and population at an aggregate level. In this 
sense, this paragraph is devoted to depicting time series of our international sample’s 
                                                 
42  Africa has been the last Continent experiencing the demographic transition. Moreover, it is the second 
most populous (and the first in terms of population growth rate) and the one with the lowest GDP per 
capita (and GDP per capita growth rate) Area considered in this study. Its inclusion in the international 
sample would increase population growth rate and decrease income per capita after the 50’s, in such a 
way that the ongoing transition would be shadowed. 
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income (both in total and in per capita terms) and population. 
  
 
3.1.1 Data 
 
During the period of our analysis, the World experienced a stable and sustained growth 
of Total Output. While in 1870, average income among countries was worth 359,363 
bilions 1990$, while in 2008 it grew up to 20,053,239 trilion 1990$, about 58 times 
larger. However, the rate of growth of income is clearly not constant. In fact, we can see 
total income trends in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Total GDP for the international sample in the period 1870-2008, in trillions 
1990$ 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
Income has grown unevenly among times. In particular, the first two decades of our 
analysis showed an annual growth rate of total output of about 2.5%, followed by an 
annual rate of 2%, and 2.8% until the 50’s. After the Second World War, the “Global” 
Takeoff permitted countries to grow at annual rates near the 4.3% (as during the 
Economy Boom, boosted by the Marshall Plan), but after this decade, income growth 
steadily declined to 2.5%. As we will see, this phenomenon has been a joint effect of a 
decrease in productivity (GDP per capita growth) and population growth. 
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On the side of income per capita, the increase over the period considered in this 
analysis is much lower than that observed for total income (from 1669.7 to 17421.9 
1990$, about 10 times larger). However, as for total output, even per capita GDP has 
shown some very different rate of increase through time, as we can see from Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Real GDP per capita for the international sample in the period 1870-2008, in 
thousands 1990$ 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
All in all, the annual growth rate of income per capita has been relatively proportional 
with the growth rate of total income. In fact, annual per capita GDP growth rate has 
decreased from 1.28% and 1.37% in 1871-1890 and 1891-1910 (“Liberal” order) to 
1.02% in 1911-1930 (mainly caused by First World War and the collapse of trade and 
capital markets). However, war expenditure during the Second World War permitted a 
rapid increase of income per capita until the late 40’s, with an annual rate of 1.7%. 
Nevertheless, a great upturn of GDP per capita growth took place during the Economic 
Boom, reaching a growth rate of 2.7% in 1951-1970 (the Maddison’s “Golden Age”), 
2% and 1.56% in 1971-1990 and 1991-2008 (also called the “Neo-liberal” order). This 
behaviour would constitute the basis for the transition from a state of high population 
growth and stagnant income to a reversed situation for most of the Second World 
countries (e.g. East Asia and Latin American countries). 
 On the population side, turning our attention to the sample considered above, we 
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could detect a similar behaviour of the one characterizing income measures. In fact, as 
for output, total population has considerably increased in the period of analysis (it grew 
from 201,671 milions to 1,082,943 billions, about 5.4 times),43 but the rate of growth 
has changed in different periods; for instance, annual population growth rate has 
increased from 1.1%  in the period 1871-1950 to 1.5% in 1951-1970, then decreased to 
1.25% and 1% in the period 1971-1990 and 1991-2008. 
 
Figure 3: Total population for the international sample in the period 1870-2008, in 
millions 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
 
3.1.2 The World’s Demographic Transition 
 
As already mentioned, the demographic transition is analysed with particular focus on 
the relation between income and population measures. As already suggested by Galor 
(2005), we will conduct our analysis using per capita GDP and population (both in 
levels and in growth rate terms). Moreover, according to Becker (1981), the decline in 
(fertility) population growth in the course of the demographic transition is a by-product 
                                                 
43  The inclusion of other regions in the dataset (e.g. East Europe and Africa) would significantly change 
figures. Population would amount to more than 6.7 billion in 2008 and would have grown of more 
than 6 times since 1870. 
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of the rise in income per capita that preceded the demographic transition. In general, this 
theory claims for the necessity of a compositional analysis. The rise in income induces a 
(fertility) population growth decline via the positive income effect that was generated by 
the rise in wages, which is dominated by the negative substitution effect brought about 
by the rising opportunity cost of children (see models proposed in Chapter 1).  
As already evident from other analysis (e.g. Madison 2003; Galor, 2005), three 
main periods characterizing the relation between income and population can be inferred; 
a Malthusian Epoch, a Post-Malthusian period and a Modern Regime. This is the result 
we aim to achieve in this Chapter; we focus our analysis in order to delimit a time 
period in which the demographic transition took place. However, in order to do this, we 
need to deeply understand what these three phases of human societies are characterized 
by. 
In general, the Malthusian Era is characterized by high population growth and 
stagnant income per capita. Most of the authors (from Maddison to Jones) found this 
empirical regularity satisfied before the Twentieth Century, so that it is generally 
associated with the earliest stages of development. The “child and infant mortality” and 
the “social security” theory give an explanation to this regularity. Agents choose to have 
many children as mortality is relatively high and utility depends on surviving children. 
In the same way, people living in an agricultural society, choose to have children in 
order to ensure their old age consumption. 
 However, the standard definition of the Malthusian Era would complicate this 
analysis in an inconvenient way. In fact, in order to study the relationship on the side of 
fertility, we should study also the relationship with death rates (see for example, Bloom 
and Canning, 2001; Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002; Dyson, 2010);44 this analysis would be 
needed in order to study the composite effect on population growth rate. This is, 
generally, what demographers do.45 In this sense, according to Malthus’ theory, the 
Malthusian era is that period of human history in which total GDP grows only because 
                                                 
44  The basis of these theories lye on the concept of intertemporal utilities. The more agents live, the more 
they will invest in education, physical capital and technological advancements (with a consideration to 
risk aversion); this postponement of utilities will permit individuals to acquire a higher income in the 
future because of wages increase due to higher schooling attainments and saving rates. This process 
will trigger the fertility channel afterwards. 
45 This approach is certainly more complete, as it discovers compositional effects between fertility and 
mortality rate, but even more it is capable of delineating the timing of such an interaction. However, 
our scope is much more limited, so that we use results on empirical literature to only address the issue 
on the side of population growth. 
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of its scale component, the population; this conclusion means that technological 
progress does not give any contribution to economic growth. As a consequence, the only 
relevant engine of growth is the labour force,46 and per capita GDP should be nearly 
stagnant. The only enhances in GDP per capita would be triggered by land discoveries 
and would be consistent only in the short run, as it would be absorbed by population 
growth. 
 Though this theory is powerful in explaining human society development and 
demographics for several centuries, it needs a criterion to be tested. The latter is offered 
by correlation analysis. In fact, diminishing labour productivity and the positive effect 
of standard of living on population size kept income per capita at a subsistence level. 
Periods characterized by the absence of changes in the level of technology or in the 
availability of land, were characterized by a stable population size and constant income 
per capita, whereas periods characterized by improvements in the technological 
environment or in the availability of land generated small gains in income per capita. In 
this sense, as long as the correlation between income per capita and population is 
positive, then the Malthusian regime holds; when this regularity brakes, we face the 
demographic Transition. 
We can test the World demographic transition both graphically and quantitatively. 
By plotting Figure 2 and the growth rate of population in Figure 3 we can see that the 
World has experienced the demographic transition in the 50’s: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 In this context it is relatively forward to think that no countries are expected to undergo Demographic 
Transition before the Industrial Revolution has completely spread in Europe (see Ashfar and Galor, 
2008). In fact authors find that the from first societies on Earth to the late Nineteenth Century, the 
Malthusian model has ruled income and population phenomena. 
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Figure 4: GDP per capita, in thousands 1990$, and population growth for the 
international sample, in the Period 1871-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
Correlation coefficients can be studied by plotting GDP per capita and population 
growth rate in two distinct series, as in Figure 5:47 
 
Figure 5: GDP per capita, in thousands 1990$, and population growth for the 
international sample, in the Period 1871-2008
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
                                                 
47 African countries are not accounted in this analysis. The inclusion will change results for its high 
population growth rate. As we will prove, Africa has experienced the Demographic Transition around 
the 90’s, so that the population growth rate would have been increasing in the period 1950-1990. 
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The correlation analysis validates our graphical intuition. In fact, population growth rate 
and income per capita are positively correlated until the 50’s with a coefficient of 0.015, 
while this relation becomes negative afterwards, with a coefficient of -0.97. 
 The following table (Table 1) gives a further proof of the demographic transition. 
Correlation coefficients between GDP per capita and population growth rates are 
computed. On the first column we report time periods, while on the second we display 
correlation coefficients and 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Long run time 
periods are reported in bold, together with correlation coefficients (with 95% confidence 
intervals). 
 
Table 1: Correlation coefficients between per capita GDP and population growth rate for 
the World, 1871-2008. Confidence Intervals at 95% in parentheses 
World Correlation Coefficients 
  
1871-1900 0.33              
(0.37,0.28) 
  
1901-1910 0.06 
(0.1,0.02) 
  
1911-1930 0.3 
(0.43,0.17) 
  
1931-1950 0.21 
(0.37,0.05) 
  
 1871-1950 
Malthusian 
Époque 
0.015 
(0.07,-0.04) 
  
1971-1990 -0.92 
(-0.86,-0.97) 
  
1991-2008 -0.89 
(-0.83,-0.94) 
  
 1951-2008 
Modern Era -0.97 
(-0.9,-1) 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
Note: Figures is bold represent long run correlations between GDP per capita and 
population growth rate. All other coefficients are short run correlations. 
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Moreover, we can appreciate the demographic transition effects also on the side of GDP 
per capita growth and population growth. In fact, given the standard decrease in 
population growth rate during the demographic transition, we can infer that the share of 
GDP per capita growth rate in total GDP growth should be increasing itself. In fact, as 
we can see from Figure 1.6, the share of Total GDP growth devoted to per capita income 
improvements has strongly increased from the 50’s onwards.: 
 
 
Figure 6: Total GDP growth rate, GDP per capita growth rate and population growth 
rate for the international sample, 1871-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
In particular, the share of GDP per capita growth rate in total GDP growth has decreased 
from its initial level of 52% to 49% after the Second World War; the idea that a Modern 
Regime holds after the 50’s is confirmed by the increase in the share of productivity 
growth in total GDP growth, which reached a level of 62% in the last two decades. 
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3.2 A Regional Analysis 
 
A complete empirical study of the demographic transition cannot be limited to a World 
Analysis. With this aim, we dedicate this paragraph to a Continent description of the 
relation between income and population quantities. What we will find is in line with 
relevant literature on the relation between per capita GDP and population growth. In 
particular, we will see that the World has experienced the demographic transition in two 
different periods of time and with two different groups of countries.  
The first group is the one characterizing more developed countries, in particular 
Western Europe and Western Offshoots (North America and Oceania). These Regions 
have experienced a very high income growth since the Nineteenth Century as a result of 
different economic and institutional factors. First of all, this “Early Takeoff” has been 
caused by a long history of Colonialism (at least for Western Europe); the great 
availability of raw materials and cheap labour (in some cases supplied by slavery) from 
Dominions boosted domestic economies on both the supply and the demand side, 
enhancing output. Second, these countries have been recognized as those with better 
economic and political institution (concept of inclusive institution, see Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2005). This process of income expansion has been accompanied 
by unpreceded technological progress, which has created higher per capita income 
(expenditure capabilities) and demand for human capital (switched by human capital 
biased technology); the interaction of the quality-quantity tradeoff and the reduction in 
child mortality (because of better sanitation and nutrition) produced the optimal 
environment for a hump-shaped population growth. As described in Chapter 1, the 
reduction in child mortality is followed, with a short delay, by a reduction in fertility; 
hence, a short run increase in net fertility was rapidly followed by a sharp decrease in 
population growth rates.48 
 The second group is the one constituted mainly by developing and 
underdeveloped countries, namely East Asia, Latin America and Africa. These Regions 
have suffered exactly the opposite conditions; rural economies still exist and totalitarian 
governments are relatively common in Asian and African countries.49 In this case, the 
reversing of the Malthusian income-population relationship has taken much more time 
                                                 
48 Note that this particular behaviour is exactly what is shown by population growth rate in Figure 1.4 
49 Many authors (among all Barro, 1999) proved that democracy comes together with growth. 
85 
 
to show up (at least an extra 50 years), and it still seems to be questionable in some 
Continents (in Africa at least). 
According to Maddison (2004), the World showed the “Great Divergence” in 
income and standards of living in the first half of the Nineteenth Century (around the 
20’s). In the year 1000 the inter-Regional spread was very narrow (about 5:6 in favour 
of the West); by 2001 all countries had increased their incomes, but the West was 
18times richer than the Rest. 
The rest of the paragraph develops as follows. In the first part we will analyse 
income and population variables that constitute the essence of the demographic 
transition in “The West”; with such an expression, we intend to refer to developed 
countries, in particular Western Europe and Western Offshoots (North America and 
Oceania). In the second part we will replicate the same analysis and tests on less 
developed (or developing) countries, named as “The Rest”; this group is formed by 
Latin America, East Asia and Africa. 
 
 
 
3.2.1 The West 
 
As already introduced, this group of countries is the one that has experienced an earlier 
and faster economic growth, both in total and per capita terms. In fact, as already stated, 
it achieved the larger share of World GDP since the early Nineteenth Century, and 
consolidated its position in the course of decades. We can study total income in the West 
by plotting Figure 7: 
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Figure 7: Total GDP, in thousands 1990$, for Western Europe and Western Offshoots in 
the Period 1870-2008 
 Source: Maddison (2013) 
  
In our sample, we can see that the West held a portion of Total World GDP of 84% from 
1870 until 1950, but it rapidly decreased in subsequent years, reaching a level of 76% 
before the 70’s, and then steadily declined until the Twenty-first Century to its actual 
value (about 72%). 
 In order to keep such a pace, Western Europe and Western Offshoots experienced 
an Income Growth that, at least for the Nineteenth and the first half of the Twenties, 
exceeded the World Growth. In fact, the annual growth rate of output in the period 
1871-1910 has always exceeded the 3% (with peaks near 3.4% in the late Nineteenth 
Century), while the World showed rate of 1 point less. In the interwar period and after 
the First World War, “The West” started a long period of sustained high growth with 
rates of 3% and 4% until 1970. After the economic boom, Western Europe and western 
Offshoots underwent a Sustained Growth path with rates lower than the World’ ones, in 
general from 0.3 to 1 points less.50 
 However the huge increase in total output has not been matched by a 
equiproportional population growth. Different population growth rate trends can be 
                                                 
50  In general, authors explain this phenomenon basing on demographic data. A large share of population 
in working age determined the availability of cheap labour and a light pension and child care system; 
these society revenues can be reemployed for production purposes. The West has simply experienced 
what The Rest is facing (or has faced) nowadays. 
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appreciated in Figure 8: 
 
Figure 8: Total population, in millions, for Western Europe and Western Offshoots in the 
Period 1871-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
The share of total population in The West is hump-shaped during the last Centuries. In 
fact, this proportion has increased from the 59% in the 70’s of the Nineteenth Century to 
the 60% around the 1910 and maintained for the interwar period. However, after this 
point, it started decreasing to 54% in 1950 up to its actual level of 45%.51 An analysis 
on population growth rates validates this reasoning. In fact, while World population and 
Western regions grew at compatible rates until 1930; in the World War times more than 
double the one experienced by the West (about 1% against 0.4%, for the World and The 
West respectively), and this kept until nowadays (1.3% for the World against 0.45%). 
 A peculiar aspect that characterizes these two Regions, the Western Europe and 
the Western Offshoots, is the geographical or cultural proximity to the United Kingdom; 
this factor seems to be of primary importance for what has been called “The Takeoff”. 
In fact, long and stable business with England has resulted to be the key element for the 
transmission of inventories and skills employed in production in the second half of the 
                                                 
51  These shares are calculated without considering Africa for consistency purposes. 
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Nineteenth Century; owing to this, income per capita has been affected strongly from 
the very beginning of the time of our analysis. In fact, we can see that per capita GDP 
has grown considerably in the considered time range just plotting Figure 9: 
 
Figure 9: GDP per capita, in thousands 1990$, for Western Europe and Western 
Offshoots in the Period 1871-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
Clearly, as Western Europe and Western Offshoots experienced a higher Total GDP 
associated with higher population growth rates (in the period 1971-1910), high GDP 
growth and low population increase (in the War time), and a situation of low GDP and 
population growth, no relation for GDP per capita growth rate can be stated a priori. 
However, analysing growth rates associated with Figure 1.8 and comparing them with 
results of the World Analysis, we can infer some useful information. In fact, we can see 
that GDP per capita grows much faster in Western Europe and Western Offshoots until 
the First World War (about 1.4% against 1.3%), then the gap shrinked because of the 
1929 financial Crisis (1.1% versus 1%). During the Second World War, the gap grew 
again (2.96% for Western Regions against 2.7%),52 and continued until nowadays 
(about 0.2% of difference in favour of The West). After the 70’s, the huge development 
in East Asia kept the pace with Europe and North America, so that rates of increase are 
                                                 
52  As one can see from the plot, this difference has to be attributed entirely to war expenditures by the 
US, which constituted an important share of national income. 
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nearly equal with some regions of the Rest. 
Regarding demographic transition, the sharp increase in income and population in 
the late Nineteenth century should not be disturbing; it could that the rate of growth of 
population is high, but still it is decreasing. In fact this is what happened, but with 
different diming for Western Europe and Western Offshoots. 
Focusing on Western Europe, we can plot GDP per capita and population growth 
rate in Figure 10, in such a way to understand whether and when this Region has 
experienced the demographic transition: 
 
Figure 10: GDP per capita, in thousands 1990$, and population growth for 
Western Europe in the Period 1871-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
As we can see from Figure 6, there is no relevant period of time in which GDP per 
capita and population growth rate are positively correlated. In particular, over the entire 
time range, the correlation coefficient is -0.32; this result validates the idea that Western 
Europe experienced the demographic transition before 1870 and it income-population 
relation can be characterized by the Modern Regime definition. This phenomenon can 
be detected from the increasing ratio of GDP per capita growth rate into GDP growth 
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rate, as shown in Figure 11: 
 
Figure 11: Total GDP growth rate, GDP per capita growth rate and population growth 
rate for Western Europe, 1871-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
  
As we can see from Figure 11, GDP per capita growth rate has absorbed an increasing 
ratio of total GDP growth. In fact, this ratio has increased from 60% until the First 
World War to 78% in the interwar period, to a long run level of 84% till nowadays. 
 The same situation emerges for Western Offshoots. As it can be seen from the 
relation between per capita GDP and population growth rate from Figure 12, there is no 
relevant period characterized by a positive correlation between per capita GDP and 
population growth rate: 
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Figure 12: GDP per capita, in thousands 1990$, and population growth for 
Western Offshoots in the Period 1871-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
As the correlation coefficient between per capita GDP and population growth rate is 
negative (-0.6) for the entire time range, the demographic transition should have taken 
place prior 1870 both in Western Europe and Western Offshoots. The same procedure 
followed for Western Europe applies to Western Offshoots when analysing the ratio of 
GDP per capita growth into population growth, as in Figure 13: 
 
Figure 13: Total GDP growth rate , GDP per capita growth rate and population growth 
rate for Western Offshoots, 1871-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
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 As we can see from Figure 13, the ratio of GDP per capita growth in total GDP 
growth has increased from 45% before the First World War to 57% after the Second 
World War, until reaching the long run value of 64%. 
 As for the international sample, we can summarise correlation coefficients 
between GDP per capita and population growth rates with 95% confidence intervals 
even for the West in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients between per capita GDP and population growth rate for 
the West, 1871-2008. Confidence Intervals at 95% in parentheses 
The West Western Europe Western Offshoots 
 1871-2008 1871-2008 
Modern Regime -0.32 
(-0.25,-0.4) 
-0.6 
(-0.51,-0.69) 
   
1871-1900 0.47               
(0.52,0.41)    
-0.42                 
(-0.32,-0.52)    
   
1901-1910 -0.05 
(-0.028,-0.07) 
-0.6 
(-0.54,-0.66) 
   
1911-1930 0.47 
(0.78,0.13) 
-0.34 
(-0.17,-0.5) 
   
1931-1950 0.02 
(0.2,-0.17) 
0.65 
(0.86,0.44) 
   
1951-1970 0.18 
(0.24,0.13) 
-0.97 
(-0.83,-1) 
   
1971-1990 -0.33 
(-0.26,-0.41) 
-0.33 
(-0.28,-0.38) 
   
1991-2008 -0.82 
(-0.78,-0.87) 
-0.87 
(-0.79,-0.95) 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
Note: Figures is bold represent long run correlations between GDP per capita and 
population growth rate. All other coefficients are short run correlations. 
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4.2.2 The Rest 
  
As for The West, the same analysis can be adopted to study the income population 
relationship in the Rest. As already introduced, these Regions are those characterized by 
a much lower level of income (and in some cases even growth of income) per capita 
form most of the timespan we consider. Different explanations have been given for this 
huge (now shrinking) divergence have been various. Most of these theories are based on 
those aspects that have characterized the West; absence of inclusive institutions and 
abundance of natural resources and labour depleted by Western colonial countries are 
among the most famous. 
Nevertheless, this explanation seems to fit for Latin American and some African 
countries only. In fact, even the US, Canada and  Australia have been English colonies 
for a long time, like most of the Asian South East; such a difference, in terms of 
economic performance, is still a matter of question for scientific literature. 53 Anyway, it 
is evident that these Regions have greatly recovered from a state of stagnant income 
level after the West suffered Oil Crises (in the 70’s). The great availability of working 
age people (low wage) has given a strong incentive for investments, so that last period 
growth rates are among the highest both in Latin America and East Asia; in this sense, 
Africa is, in most of its countries, still waiting for this event to show up.54 To start the 
analysis, we first have to plot Total GDP for Latin America, East Asia and Africa as in 
Figure 14:55 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Nevertheless, Asian and Latin America countries rapidly covered what they’ve lagged behind the 70’s; 
for instance, China Total GDP reached the US in 2014, but still GDP per capita is far from being 
achieved (according to IMF, it is still at a ratio of 1:5). However, this extraordinary growth is heavily 
threatened because of the adoption of limiting fertility policies. 
54  In Africa, cultural lignage in favor of numerous families is still very strong. Though some countries 
(e.g Rwanda) income growth has been roughly comparable to many others in East Asia, this has often 
been counteracted by sharp increases in population, leaving per capita GDP to its (poverty trap) level. 
55  We just present datas from 1990 fro Latin America and from 1950 for East Asia and Africa in Figure 
1.15 for representation purposes. Its representation in annual observation would force to exclude some 
fundamental countries (like China, India and Argentina) because of availability of data. Political 
conflicts in Latin America give some strangely interpreted business cycles made of few years. 
Moreover, the difference in scale between Latin America and East Asia GDP, compared to the one in 
Africa, does not give full intuition of trends. 
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Figure 14: Total GDP, in thousands 1990$, for Latin America, East Asia and Africa in 
the Period 1900-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
From Figure 14, it is possible to calculate associated growth rates. In particular, we can 
see that total GDP growth rates fit with what already introduced before. In fact, we can 
see that the growth of total output has been in line with the World rates until 1950, 
though it differed greatly among Regions; for instance, East Asia managed to reach a 
total income growth rate that has been double than that in Latin America for about 40 
years. However, these Regions succeeded in the so called “Take off” and started 
increasing at an outstanding pace from the end of the 70’s till nowadays. The average 
GDP growth rate has never been below 3.5% and Latin America gained nearly 4% every 
year (starting from a growth level of 1.5% just 20 years before). Also Africa, thanks to 
international investors for oil depletion,  
 However, a relevant population growth has determined a huge delay in the 
increase in GDP per capita, as shown in Figure 15: 
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Figure 15: Total population, in millions, for Latin America, East Asia and Africa in the 
Period 1900-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
In the period we considered, population growth has been roughly stable in all Regions, 
but it presents the characteristic hump-shaped behaviour of countries during the 
demographic transition; this peculiarity is clearer in following Figures. In fact, 
population growth steadily grow from the beginning of the Twentieth (1.8% for Latin 
America and 0.7% for East Asia), until reaching the peak in the 60’s (with 2.8% for 
Latin America and about 2% for China). Africa has its own story to tell; in these 
countries, population growth in the 50’s and 60’s grew at a rate of 2.4%, then it grew to 
2.8% and then fall again in the last decade of the century to 2%. 
 Clearly, income per capita has been influenced by this rapid response of 
population to income growth, as shown in Figure 16: 
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Figure 16: Per capita GDP, in thousands 1990$, for Latin America, East Asia and Africa 
in the Period 1900-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
Until the Second World War, real GDP per capita grew with rates of about than 1.6% 
(the West growth rate), ranging from 2.6% to 0.9%. After the War Period, both Latin 
America and East Asia increased sensitively their growth rates, achieving 2.2% (mostly 
because of the outstanding increase in growth in Latin America). Finally, the “Take off” 
and Globalization, did not permit a rapid transfer of GDP growth on per capita 
capabilities; in fact, GDP per capita did not grow more than in the 50’s (about 2.1%). In 
order for his to happen, the Rest had to wait until the 90’s, in which it got to a annual 
increase of 3.4%, mainly because of the outstanding performance of East Asia (with 
rates of 4.2%). Other regions lagged behind with rates ranging from 1.7% (Latin 
America) to 1.3% (Africa) because of lacks in political stability (e.g. financial crack in 
Argentina in 2001) or retards in those social developments bring to the demographic 
transition (for Africa, in which GDP growth mainly translated into population growth 
until 1995).  
 The same analysis for the West applies for the study of the demographic transition 
in the Rest; hence we proceed with the comparison of correlation in different periods 
between income per capita and population growth rates. In this sense, we can figure out 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1895 1915 1935 1955 1975 1995
G
D
P
 p
er
 c
ap
it
a
Time
GDP per capita Latin America GDP per capita East Asia GDP per capita Africa
97 
 
the timing of the transition by plotting Figure 16 with growth rates of Figure 15 for 
Latin America: 
 
Figure 17: GDP per capita, in thousands 1990$, and population growth for Latin 
America in the Period 1871-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
From Figure 1.17, it is straightforward to notice that the demographic transition has 
produced its effects around the early 60’s. This argument is made stronger by many 
occasions in which GDP per capita and population growth showed a positive 
dependence between before the 60’s (e.g. the troughs During the First and the starting of 
the Second World Wars) and a negative afterwards (e.g. the absolutely opposite 
behaviour in the 80’s). To prove this statement, we can use the following plot in which 
single series before and after 1960 are investigated in their correlations. Though already 
evident from the picture, it is possible to see that the correlation coefficient between 
income per capita and population growth is positive (0.71) before 1960 and negative (-
0.93) until 2008. As for the West, we can appreciate demographic transition’s effects on 
the ratio of total GDP absorbed in GDP per capita growth: 
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Figure 18: Total GDP growth rate, GDP per capita growth rate and population growth 
rate for Latin America, 1901-2008. 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
In fact, GDP per capita growth share in total GDP growth has decreased from about 
58% at the beginning of the last century to 38% in the interwar period; after the Second 
World War, the share of productivity growth started increasing again up to the actual 
levelof 50%.56  
As we have proceeded for Latin America, we will study the East Asia case. In 
order to study the Asian demographic transition, we plot GDP per capita and population 
growth rate in Figure 19: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56  The share of GDP per capita growth in total GDP growth drastically fell to 32% in the early 80’s 
because of the Latin America debt crisis. 
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Figure 19: GDP per capita, in thousands 1990$, and population growth for East Asia in 
the Period 1950-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
We can see that the growth rate of population oscillates during the whole analysis 
period. However, it is possible to see that two trends are present in the population series, 
an increasing one until 1970 and a decreasing one afterwards. Moreover, though the 
collapse at the end of the Second World War (caused by the disastrous defeat of Japan), 
the income per capita series results to be increasing for the entire timespan. Owing to 
this, the demographic transition should have come up around the late 70’s. In fact, by 
following the same procedure of Latin America, we can see that the correlation 
coefficient between income per capita and population growth rate until 1975 is 0.39 and 
becomes -0.85 until 2008. This conclusion is strongly supported by the huge trough in 
both GDP per capita and population growth rate experienced at the end of the Second 
World War. 
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Figure 20: Total GDP growth rate, GDP per capita growth rate and population growth 
rate in East Asia, 1951-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
 According to Figure 20, the share of GDP per capita growth in total GDP growth 
has decreased in the first two decades (from 65% in 1950-1970 to 63% in 1970-1990),57 
while it started increasing afterwards, reaching a level of 78% in the last twenty years. 
Finally, we study the demographic transition in Africa by plotting GDP per capita 
and population growth rate in Figure 21: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Note that the reduction in the share of GDP per capita growth in total GDP growth is relatively small. 
This is a consequence of the fact that East Asia experienced the demographic transition in the early 
70’s, so that half of the decade is characterized by a declining population growth rate. 
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Figure 21 GDP per capita, in thousands 1990$, and population growth for Africa in the 
Period 1950-2008
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
 
It is possible to show that series are positively correlated (with a coefficient of 0.9) until 
1995, and negatively correlated from 1996 (with a coefficient of -0.9).58 Also the share 
of per capita in total income followed this trend, as shown in Figure 22:  
 
Figure 22: Total GDP growth rate, GDP per capita growth rate and population growth 
rate for Africa, 1951-2008 
 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
                                                 
58 Though population growth rate appears to be decreasing after 1980, also real GDP per capita is stagnant 
(or possibly decreasing); this is a further proof of the Malthusian framework. 
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The share of GDP per capita growth in total income growth started from a level of 
45% and steadily declined until reaching only the 8%; then, it increased at the beginning 
of the new millennium up to 37%.  
Finally, we plot Table 3 with Correlation Coefficients between GDP per capita and 
population growth rates for the Rest. Confidence intervals at 95% are in parentheses: 
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients between per capita GDP and population growth rate for 
the Rest, 1901-2008. Confidence Intervals at 95% between parentheses 
The Rest Latin America East Asia Africa 
    
1901-1910 -0.56                
(-0.5,-0.62)      
  
    
1911-1930 0.86 
(0.98,0.74) 
  
    
1931-1950 0.73 
(1,0.47) 
  
    
 1901-1950   
Malthusian 
Époque 
0.72 
(0.84,0.59) 
  
    
1951-1970   -0.45              
(-0.42,-0.48)    
0.39 
(0.63,0.16) 
0.9                 
(0.97,0.82)    
    
  1951-1971  
Malthusian 
Époque 
 0.44              
   (0.68,0.2)     
 
    
1971-1990 -0.69 
(-0.58,-0.79) 
-0.58                
(-0.41,-0.68)    
0.74 
(0.81,0.66) 
    
   1951-1995 
Malthusian 
Époque 
  0.9 
(0.97,0.83) 
    
1991-2008 -0.86 
(-0.77,-0.96) 
-0.69 
(-0.59,-0.8) 
-0.72                
(-0.65,-0.78) 
    
 1951-2008 1972-2008 1996-2008 
New Regime -0.93 
(-0.85,-1) 
-0.83 
(-0.71,-0.96) 
-0.9 
(-0.86,-0.93) 
Source: Maddison (2013) 
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Note: Figures is bold represent long run correlations between GDP per capita and 
population growth rate. All other coefficients are short run correlations. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
 
 
The demographic transition is, no doubt, one of the most important and diffused 
phenomena that has affected the World as a whole in the last Century. Though some 
countries have not undergone this phenomenon, the latter is already producing its effects 
in many Continents. Sharp reduction in mortality rates (in particular for infants) and an 
enlargement of life expectations at birth shifted resources devoted to rising children in 
favour of consumption. As a result, population aging and fertility below the replacement 
threshold caused and an ongoing reversing of the demographic piramid and the 
unsustainability of a large variety of pension systems (especially the unfunded category, 
the most diffused nowadays). 
In this work we have presented the main theories that have been proposed for 
explaining the relation between population dynamics and economic growth. Economic 
Theory has relied for more than one and a half Centuries on the Malthusian Theory; a 
short increase in income translates immediately into population growth, leaving the 
economy to a subsistence level of GDP per capita. This mechanism has ruled the World 
from the beginning of human societies until the late Nineteenth Century, but at a certain 
point in time something changed. In the Western World, a technological progress boom 
(Industrial Revolution) gave a strong boost to per capita income, and the relation 
between output and population has been reversed. The availability of reliable data on 
demographic and production quantities let this new regularity emerge. The economic 
answers to this destabilizing phenomenon were among the most articulated ever given 
to a social issue, because of the outstanding exceptionality and relevancy of the topic for 
future development. In this paper, three main answer have been developed in a 
chronological scheme. 
 
In the first chapter of the present work, we describe three main theories that have 
been proposed to explain the demographic transition.  
The first theory moves from the work by Becker (1960) and founds the transition 
on the heterogeneity of children; offspring are consumption goods whose quality 
matters for parents. This concept of quality, as already stated, is not a matter of birth, 
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but rather the result of time (opportunity cost of labour wage) and, in some cases, the 
goods that parents decide to invest in children. This investment is justified by the 
dependence of parents’ utility from children welfare (human capital, future wage or 
utility, concept of parental altruism), and constitutes the fundamentals for the 
demographic transition. If elasticity of children quality to income is greater than the 
elasticity of quantity to income, then economic growth will determine the passage from 
a state of high fertility to a stage of low fertility (Demeny, 1956). Parents will prefer 
children quality to children quantity as a result of the maximization process. This result 
is in contrast with one of the basic assumptions of the Malthusian model, so that fertility 
is an increasing function of income per capita. Moreover, long run income will result to 
be higher because of greater human capital accumulation. It is clear that this conclusion 
leaves space for the debate on schooling systems. In general, economic theory of the 
quality-quantity tradeoff does not set any fundamental difference between a private and 
a public education system if heterogeneity of agents is not taken into account. In 
general, the fundamental role of public provided education is the one of reducing 
inequality with respect to the situation in which it is not provided (see Doepke, 2004). 
In fact, the only private schooling would break the society in two categories. One would 
be characterized by high income level and few better children (New Regime); the other 
would procreate many unskilled offspring, with few resources escaping a poverty trap 
(Malthusian World). However, fertility would result to be higher than the optimal one, 
so that it should be taxed for financing the education sector. 
The second theory that has been analysed in the first chapter of the present work 
finds the cause of the demographic transition in a reduction of infant and child 
mortality. This theory is based on the concept of surviving children (see Ohara, 1975; 
Pen Porah, 1976), by which parents are interested in the number of offspring that will 
survive until a certain period of their lifetime. This assumption changes the Malthusian 
model in a radical way. In fact, in its original version, mortality rates were a 
predetermined decreasing function of income per capita. According to this theory, child 
mortality can be assumed to be exogenous or endogenous. In case it is exogenous, 
agents perceive they cannot do anything to reduce it, so that they will take it as a 
parameter when maximizing. In the other case, agents believe that they can reduce it via 
sanitation (ether private of public) and other forms of child care (human capital 
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endowments, for instance parental control). In the short run, a reduction in child 
mortality will determine a reduction in fertility as well, in order to keep an equivalence 
in net fertility; as growth goes by, the activation of a quality-quantity tradeoff will 
determine a further reduction in fertility and the transition to a New Regime.  
Finally, in the third part of the first chapter we present theories explaining the 
demographic transition as a consequence of the introduction of social security policies. 
By construction OLG models are suitable for considering heterogeneity of individuals 
in different stages of their life. In this sense, the most immediate approach would be to 
consider a childhood period (in which children go to school and accumulate human 
capital), a working age (in which adults receive a labour wage and maximize utilities 
with respect to consumption, labour supply and fertility) and a retirement period (in 
which they consume). Clearly, agents may decide to finance old age consumption in 
three ways. The first one would be to save income as in models of intertemporal 
maximization (see Fisher, 1930). The second one would be to invest resources in 
children, who are going to give material support during the old age; this idea is the so 
called “old-age security hypothesis”. However, this theory has not been developed in an 
altruistic framework for obvious reasons. The last possible way to finance old age 
consumption is by investing resources in a social security scheme, which takes the form 
of pension systems. In these frameworks, people are taxed on labour income (so the 
budget constraint during adulthood in negatively affected) and will receive a 
consumption subsidy when old. The way in which they’ll get back resources in the 
future gives the distinction between funded and unfunded systems. Anyway, this theory 
is very interesting for two reasons. First of all, like other theories of demographic 
transition, it is a real theory of Development; poor rural societies will tend to overinvest 
in fertility to maintain labour productivity in the future, while developed economies will 
prefer better children quality. Second, it permits a useful and interesting comparison 
between the selfish and altruistic hypothesis. In both cases, the dependency of fertility 
to the introduction of social security systems will be negative (and lower in magnitude 
in case of altruism), but a change in the interest rate would translate differently 
according to preferences. If parents are selfish, an increase in the interest rate (so that of 
the amount of pension transfers) will negatively affect fertility (and positively actual 
consumption), but the opposite happens if parents are altruistic toward children (see 
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Cigno, 1992; Cigno and Rosati, 1992), or even if there is mutual altruism.  
 
The second Chapter develops the Barro-Becker (1989) model as an example of 
intergenerational model with altruism. In this framework, agents live for two periods, 
but the altruism toward children permits to consider the possibility of infinitively lived 
agents maximizing instantaneous utilities according to a discount factor. A peculiarity of 
the model is the concept of pure altruism, by which agents are interested to descendants’ 
utilities and not other measures (for instance child quantity). This altruism function is 
assumed to be a decreasing function of fertility itself, but still utility is increasing and 
concave in offspring number; the same happens for consumption. A fundamental and 
very strong assumption made in the model is the additivity and separability of utility, 
which stands for time consistency of choices. Though this assumption could result fuzzy 
in an intergenerational model (the idea that generations will be motivated always and 
only by altruism, without deviations from a sort of “social contract”) it is a logic 
consequence of homogeneity assumptions. If generations are all equal among 
themselves, and differ only because of cohort size, this fundamental condition is surely 
justified. Moreover, the production side is assumed to replicate the Solowian 
framework. Conclusions that are drawn from this framework are, to some extents, in 
line with what proposed by approaches studied in the first Chapter of this work. 
Consumption is a positive function of the net cost of producing another descendant in 
the same generation. This result derives from the fact that, this in specification, the rate 
of growth across generations of consumption per person is essentially independent of 
the level of interest rates, and also does not depend on pure altruism or time preference. 
On the other side, fertility rises with parental altruism coefficient and the interest rate 
(same conclusion as in the case of an economy with social securities). This result is 
derived from the consideration that there is an effect implied by the interest rate that 
tends to increase consumption over time and this effect dominates the increase in the 
cost for capital in the steady state. A rise in the initial level of wealth will only have an 
effect in the short run, with an increase in both consumption and fertility, but it will 
disappear in the long run. Given that wealth is a component of income per capita (as it 
can be reinvested in capital accumulation and labour force through fertility), this hump 
shaped behavior of fertility can be interpreted as the model answer to demographic 
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transition. The introduction of child mortality will decrease (surviving) child rearing 
cost and so that demand for children; this result is in line with previous literature. 
However, other results seem to give an answer to some of previous contradicting 
conclusions. For instance, the introduction of a social security system will activate a 
substitution mechanism that will tend to reduce fertility in the long run, and this in line 
with Prinz (1990) and Zhang (1995); this condition will hold depending on the interest 
rate and fertility. However, the opposite condition will be triggered if the condition on 
parameters does not hold, and this validates Cigno and Rosati (1992). Parents would not 
change consumption patterns (as dynastic wealth has not changed) and will generate 
less children because of an increase in the cost of rising them (consequence of the 
Ricardian Equivalence). 
 
Finally, in the third chapter of this work, we propose an empirical analysis for 
detecting the timing of demographic transition. The method we use is based on the 
correlation analysis between GDP per capita and population growth. According to 
Becker (1960), the demographic transition appears in the passage from a positive 
correlation between income per capita and population growth (or fertility for a one sided 
analysis) to a negative correlation. The sample we’ve used to compute plots and tests in 
obtained from Maddison (2013) and consists in a group of 12 countries (from 4 
Continents) for the period from 1871 to 2008. The availability of complete data has 
been the main obstacle to a more comprehensive exercise. However, results are in line 
with all main works in the field; a long Malthusian Époque governs the relation until 
1950, after which a sharp decline in population growth rate brings the system to the 
Modern Regime. 
We also carry out a Regional analysis for investigating the timing of transitions 
in different Regions of the World. In this sense, we follow the specification offered by 
Galor (2004) of the West (Western Europe and Western Offshoots) and the Rest (Latin 
America, East Asia and Africa); clearly, the availability of data constrained our analysis 
in the time dimension (for instance we study East Asia and Africa from 1950). 
Nevertheless results are clear and reliable. The West already presents a negative 
correlation between GDP per capita and population growth rate since the beginning of 
the analysis. This result is supported by many authors (e.g. Galor, 2004; Maddison, 
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2005) and is justified by the strong GDP per capita growth that has been experienced by 
these regions in the middle of the Nineteenth Century. Finally, the Rest deserves a 
analysis on its own. In fact, these Regions have been characterized by very low initial 
values of income, by social and political unrest and bad geographical conditions. All 
these factors, together with cultures and traditions ingrained into the society in favour of 
large families, made the demographic transition delay quite long. In fact, we can see 
that the onset of a reduction in population growth rates has started in 1950 for Latin 
America, in 1970 for East Asia and 1995 for Africa. 
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Appendix A 
 
The “World”: Weighted sample of 12 countries from 4 Continents: 
 
 Western Europe: France, United Kingdom, Spain 
 Western Offshoots: Australia, Canada, United States of America 
 Latin America: Brazil, Chile, Uruguay 
 East Asia: Indonesia (and Tomor until 1990), Japan, Sri Lanka. 
 
Regional Analysis: selected group of countries by Continent: 
 
 Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain 
 Western Offshoots: Australia, New Zeeland, Canada, United States 
 Latin American: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
 East Asia: China, India, Indonesia (including Timor until 1999), Japan, Sri 
Lanka. 
 Africa: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoro Islands, Congo 
'Brazzaville', Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire (Congo Kinshasa), Zambia, Zimbabwe 
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